- Ukraine War: Yes, Russia Can Lose
- The New Sino-American Cold War?
- The Israel-Hamas War
By Shashi P.B.B. Malla
Uncertainty in Ukraine
Ukraine does face uncertainty on the battlefield this year, as Russia is highly expected to make an offensive large-scale attack.
At the same time, one military historian reminds us that for all its heft, Russia can indeed lose (CNN/Fareed’s Global Briefing, May 9).
On the latest War on the Rocks podcast, military analyst Michael Kofman told host Ryan Evans that the US $ Dollar 61 billion in US military aid passed by Congress last month will buy time for Ukraine – perhaps another year of it – at a critical moment.
But manpower issues linger over Ukraine’s forces, and the next few months of fighting could say a lot about how the rest of 2024 will unfold.
Kofman suggests watching closely between now and July, then again in autumn, to gauge whether Russia will make significant gains.
In a Politico Mgazine essay, retired US Army Brigadier General Mark T. Kimmitt argues the West needs to do more, like loosen the rules of engagement attached to some of the weapons it is sending to Ukraine.
At CNN Opinion, however, historian Timothy Snyder points out that Russia’s war record shows that it’s capable of loosing.
Last week, Russia celebrated Victory Day ( its major holiday to commemorate the victory over Nazi Germany), and Snyder writes that the Red Square parade is about promoting an air of invincibility around Russia’s army – and, by extension, an air of inevitability on the battlefields of Ukraine. Calling that a fallacy, Snyder ultimately draws a hopeful lesson about Russia’s future.
“The notion of an invincible Red Army is propaganda,” Snyder writes.
“The Red Army was formidable, but it was also beatable. Of its three most consequential foreign wars, the Red Army lost two.
It was defeated by Poland in 1920.
It defeated Nazi Germany in 1945, after nearly collapsing in 1941.
Soviet forces were in trouble in Afghanistan immediately after their invasion and had to withdraw a decade later.
It is normal for Russia to lose wars.
And, in general, this led Russians to reflect and reform.
Defeat in Crimea forced an autocracy to end serfdom.
Russia’s loss to Japan led to an experiment with elections.
The Soviet failure in Afghanistan led to Gorbachev’s reforms and thus the end of the Cold War.
The peaceful Europe of today consists of powers that lost their last imperial wars and then chose democracy. It is not only possible to lose your last imperial war: it is also good, not only for the world, but for you.”
Sino-American Rumblings
It is a matter of serious debate whether the US and China are locked in a ‘New Cold War’.
In a recent Foreign Affairs essay, former top Trump hand Matt Pottinger and now-former Republican Representative Mike Gallagher argued China is already waging a cold war against the U.S.
Washington, in their view, should acknowledge this and try to win.
“Xi, who has vilified Gorbachev and fashioned his own leadership style after that of Joseph Stalin, has proved time and again that he is not a leader with whom Americans can solve problems,” they wrote.
“He is an agent of chaos,” the leader of a country that helps Russia as it besieges Ukraine and propagandizes against the US online.
Pottinger made the case to Fareed Zakaria on the CNN/Global Public Square show, arguing the US should reopen the Cold War playbook and seek to contain China [ which it is already undertaking with various multilateral security arrangements ] until it collapses under its own weight as the Soviet Union did.
In another Foreign Affairs essay, keen China watcher and now-former Biden administration official Elizabeth Economy writes that it is “undeniable” Xi wants “to remake the world” on terms more favourable to China.
“He wants to dissolve Washington’s network of alliances” and remove “Western values from international bodies like the UN, Economy writes.
“In his new multipolar order, global institutions and norms will be underpinned by Chinese notions of common security and economic development, Chinese values of state-determined political rights and Chinese technology.”
Zakaria has argued to the contrary. Today’s China isn’t like the USSR, he pointed out last week on Sunday’s CNN/Global Public Square (GPS).
Where the Soviet Union saw its economic model sputter well before it collapsed, its lifespan extended by the 1970s’ oil-price surge, China today has a diversified economy with a booming tech sector.
Where the USSR was walled off from the West, China is deeply intertwined with it thanks to massive volumes of trade.
Hoping China’s party-state will collapse, Zakaria argued, sounds a bit like calls for regime change in Iraq in 2003 – and this merits extreme caution.
As Wang Jisi noted in a Foreign Affairs essay last autumn, China also seems uninterested in converting other countries to its political system as the Soviet Union sought to do.
At Foreign Policy, a substantive review essay by columnist Michael Hirsh, touches on the above points and more.
As a balanced and farsighted middle-ground, Hirsh nods to New York Times correspondent’s David Sanger’s book “New Cold Wars”, which notes for instance that the iPhones Americans carry are still largely made in China, and that may not change soon [ some are assembled in India ].
Hirsh’s own assessment: We’re not in a “cold war”, which involves a zero-sum clash for total domination, but a “cold peace”: a non-lethal competition for influence with “no winner and no finish line.”
In other words, today’s superpower politics aren’t nearly as stark or as deadly as in the 20th century.
“China is doing little to displace the international system that the United States and other Western powers created,” Hirsh argues.
“Instead China seems mainly intent on beating the United States at its own game within that system. Beijing really has no other choice if it wants to sustain its economy, many experts say.”
Israel: The State of the Nation
After a visit to the region, the inimitable Richard Haass, the President-Emeritus of the US Council on Foreign Relations realized that positive change is possible – even in the Middle East (“Home & Away” Newsletter, May 10).
Two aspects of life in today’s Israel reminded Haass of the United States.
First, the country had become very divided.
There are, of course, reminders everywhere of the hostages. But there is no consensus on how their fate ought to be balanced against the prosecution of the war against Hamas.
Second, much of the division revolves around perceptions of the prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu.
He is no less central to the conversation in Israel than is Donald Trump in the United States.
Netanyahu is revered by his supporters and reviled by his critics, “who are no less vitriolic than Trump’s in maintaining Netanyahu’s and his ultra-conservative allies are a threat to Israeli democracy and to Israel itself. Middle ground is rare” (Haass).
It was clear to Haass that the Israeli government has made the pursuit of the war against Hamas a higher priority than gaining the release of the hostages, a reality underscored by Netanyahu’s decision not to hold off launching the initial phase of the attack on Rafah.
Hamas has also done its part to make reaching a hostage and ceasefire deal less likely by attacking Israeli soldiers near Kerem Shalom — one of the entry points into Gaza — and by demanding a permanent ceasefire, something it knows Israel will not yet agree to.
Haass estimates that the best chance for a long-term ceasefire and a full hostage return will come after the Israelis complete their punitive action(s) in Rafah.
Arms & the Man
Another big development is the Biden decision to hold off sending select arms – essentially large bombs that inevitably cause damage and casualties in an area beyond the immediate target – and its readiness to hold off sending selected additional military items if Israel goes ahead with a large-scale assault on Rafah.
However, it is not an embargo as some are claiming.
Nor is Israel being abandoned or left alone to fight.
99 % percent of US military aid – that totals close to US $ Dollar 4 billion annually – will continue to flow.
After all, the United States and Israel cooperated very closely several weeks ago in neutralizing hundreds of missiles and drones launched by Iran and would so again if the need arises.
The United States also joined Israel in opposing a UN General Assembly resolution advocating full Palestinian statehood, arguing such matters are best resolved through direct negotiations.
Many US critics are slamming the arms decision as motivated by voters in Michigan state or by the many campus protests across America.
Domestic politics and the critical stance of the Leftists in the Democratic Party may have influenced the decision, but, at the same time, the Biden administration seems to genuinely believe Israel is on the wrong track – both militarily and morally – in how it has been fighting the Gaza war and in the mistaken belief it can eliminate Hamas permanently.
The Biden administration also disagrees with Israeli policies regarding settlements in the occupied West Bank and the flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza.
Most of all, the US president and his closest advisers think Israel lacks a viable strategy for what would come after the war on Hamas – and without such a long-term strategy Israel cannot succeed.
The Biden administration, of course, acted too late in checking Israeli excesses, so that Israel is on the verge of being declared a pariah state.
After Rafah, What?
The central question remains what comes after the Rafah operation.
Haass continues to believe Israel would be sensible to introduce a political initiative alongside its military action.
It needs to marginalize Hamas as much as degrade it, and while the latter is a military task, the former a political one, and can only be accomplished by articulating a pathway by which Palestinians can achieve more through peaceful coexistence, diplomacy and compromise than by terrorism.
Instead, the Israeli government has decided on what best can be described as a sequential policy: first defeat Hamas, then think about what comes next.
This stance is motivated both by politics – it is not clear the ruling coalition could survive any move in the direction of satisfying Palestinian nationalism that could lead to any sort of second state – and by a widely-held skepticism that Palestinians could ever make for good neighbours.
The issue could well move to centre stage in a matter of weeks, i.e. once the Rafah operation is declared over.
The Israeli government doesn’t want to see Hamas revive and become the Hezbollah of Gaza, opposes bringing in what it views as a corrupt and ineffectual Palestinian Authority, and wants to avoid a prolonged Israeli occupation that would prove costly and controversial.
The Military Component
It would like there be a multinational Arab force of some sort to take over the task of providing security in Gaza, which among other things is essential if rebuilding and reconstruction is to happen.
Any such force faces two hurdles, according to Haass.
One is military. No amount of Israeli military action in Rafah will destroy or eliminate Hamas.
A security force in Gaza would face a demanding environment. Hamas would likely resist turning the mission more into one of peacemaking rather than peacekeeping.
There would be casualties. Determining rules of engagement would be difficult. Success would require a long-term commitment of capable forces from several Arab countries.
It would also need a sizable Palestinian component to lend it legitimacy.
The Political Dimension
But a military force will require political cover. It cannot be seen or made to be seen as the handmaiden of Israel. This can only be achieved if the Israeli government is much more forthcoming on Palestinian political aspirations than it is prepared to be.
Haass is convinced that there is considerable interest in both the Arab world and in Israel for all this to come together.
The writer can be reached at: shashipbmalla@hotmail.com
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect People’s Review’s editorial stance.
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