By Deepak Joshi Pokhrel
Nepal and India share a unique bilateral relationship. The open border, shared culture, economic interdependence, and deep-rooted people-to-people ties make this relationship special. What is particularly interesting is that, with few exceptions, since the 1990 people’s movement, it has been customary for Nepali prime ministers to visit India soon after assuming office. Put simply, it has become an unwritten convention of Nepal’s foreign policy. However, a fundamental question is now being raised: how long should this tradition continue?
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that Prime Minister Balen has received an invitation from India for an official visit. Although the dates are yet to be finalized, this has already sparked debate over whether he should continue the tradition. There are clearly divided opinions—both for and against the visit.
Since the restoration of a multiparty democracy in 1990, Nepal has witnessed around 30 governments. Logically speaking, this reflects a pattern of instability over the past 36 years. After decades of political uncertainty, Balen is now leading a near two-thirds majority government, which is expected to serve a full five-year term. Public expectations are high, with many believing that he will not repeat the missteps of his predecessors.
Foreign policy in Nepal has always been a sensitive domain, given the country’s geostrategic location. However, Nepal’s foreign policies have often appeared to be influenced by external actors. When the Nepali Congress comes to power, policies tend to align with the interests of the southern neighbor, India. On the other hand, communist governments are often seen as leaning toward China and shaping policies that serve northern interests. This pattern suggests a lack of a consistent foreign policy framework.
The present cabinet consists of a cohort of young members from diverse backgrounds. A large majority possess strong academic credentials—indeed, few would question their educational qualifications. However, they lack sufficient exposure to international relations and foreign policy. This became evident when a debate was triggered following Balen’s meeting with ambassadors, raising questions about adherence to diplomatic decorum.
After decades of frustration, hardship, and political instability, the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), under Balen’s leadership, came to power. Nepalis have placed high hopes in the RSP, and public expectations are correspondingly elevated. At the same time, there is a perception that the RSP is relatively closer to India. Against this backdrop, the visit will be crucial from both diplomatic and political perspectives, as any misstep could have domestic repercussions for the Balen-led government.
Nepal maintains a policy of equidistance between its two immediate neighbors—India and China. However, its relationship with India remains deeper and more multifaceted due to shared language, culture, religion, and an open border. Yet such proximity does not imply a hierarchical relationship. Nepal, though smaller in size, is a sovereign nation and has the right to conduct its foreign policy based on mutual benefit and equality. No external force should dictate its decisions. In the current political context, a fundamental question arises: why should every Nepali prime minister make India their first official foreign visit?
Past experience suggests that no government in Nepal has survived without the support of external actors. During his tenure, Prime Minister Prachanda visited China in 2008 before traveling to India. Many political analysts interpreted this as a departure from the ‘India First’ convention, signaling a shift in diplomatic posture. Similarly, during his third tenure, KP Oli was unable to secure an early visit to India, reportedly due to tensions following Nepal’s decision to publish a revised political map including Lipulekh and Limpiyadhura. Oli later visited China in 2025 to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit, where he held bilateral meetings with Chinese and other leaders.
Many observers viewed these events as departures from long-standing diplomatic practices, with notable political implications. According to them, deviations—whether intentional or incidental—from conventional diplomatic sequencing carry significant sensitivity within Nepal’s foreign policy landscape. This raises an uncomfortable question: is Nepal’s foreign policy truly sovereign, or is it shaped to appease external actors?
On the other hand, there is little evidence to suggest that Indian prime ministers make Nepal their first official visit after assuming office. Former Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujral visited Nepal in 1997, while Narendra Modi visited Nepal at the invitation of then Prime Minister Sushil Koirala after a gap of 17 years. However, in neither case was Nepal their first foreign destination. In fact, Modi’s first foreign visit was to Bhutan. Notably, even Gujral—who championed the ‘neighborhood-first’ approach—did not choose Nepal as his first destination. This clearly illustrates the absence of a reciprocal diplomatic convention.
It is widely acknowledged that Nepal upholds mutual respect and sovereign equality as guiding principles of its foreign policy. However, India has often been perceived as undermining these principles. In the current context, India needs to move away from a “big brother” approach and respect the sovereignty of its neighbors, regardless of their size or economic strength.
Now is an appropriate time to take a fresh look at the ‘India First’ approach. It is time to redefine it based on sovereign equality, mutual respect, and strategic clarity. The challenge for Nepal is not to choose between India and China, but to confidently engage with both. Nepal’s foreign policy stands at a crossroads. It should neither bow to external pressure nor seek to appease others. In conclusion, diplomatic conventions should not become strategic compulsions.
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