By Santosh Kumar Dhakal, Major General (Retd.), Nepal Army

The evolving geopolitical environment of the twenty-first century has revived concerns regarding nuclear brinkmanship in regional conflicts involving major powers. The ongoing confrontation involving United States, Israel, and Iran illustrates how modern wars may rapidly escalate beyond conventional military engagement. While some analysts consider the conflict a strategic choice for the United States, it may represent a war of survival for Israel and Iran if existential security concerns become dominant. In such circumstances, the possibility of nuclear escalation cannot be entirely dismissed. This article analyzes the strategic conditions that could push belligerents toward the nuclear threshold and evaluates mechanisms through which the international community may prevent escalation. Drawing lessons from historical crises—particularly the Cuban Missile Crisis—the study argues that nuclear crises are ultimately resolved through political prudence, diplomatic negotiation, and crisis management rather than military dominance.

Modern warfare increasingly unfolds within a complex geopolitical environment characterized by technological advancements, regional rivalries, and the weakening of arms control regimes. Conflicts involving multiple actors often create strategic uncertainty and raise the possibility of escalation beyond conventional limits.

The present confrontation involving the United States, Israel, and Iran reflects this complexity. Within a short period, the conflict has already resulted in considerable destruction in both human and material terms. Strategic analysts differ in their interpretation of the conflict’s underlying motives. Some argue that the war represents a strategic choice for the United States, intended to maintain deterrence credibility and regional influence. For Israel and Iran, however, the conflict may gradually assume the character of a war of survival, where national security and regime stability become paramount concerns.

When conflicts reach such existential dimensions, nuclear weapons may enter strategic calculations. Although nuclear weapons remain under political authority rather than military command, the pressure of wartime decision-making could lead political leaders to consider nuclear signaling or brinkmanship as a means of deterrence.This raises an important question: if nuclear escalation becomes imminent, can the international community prevent a catastrophic outcome?

The concept of the nuclear threshold refers to the stage at which nuclear weapons begin to enter a state’s strategic calculations during a conflict. Nuclear deterrence theory developed during the Cold War emphasized that nuclear weapons function primarily as political instruments rather than operational battlefield weapons. Even in the early years of the nuclear age, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin reportedly recognized the psychological and political nature of nuclear weapons. According to accounts often cited in Cold War strategic literature, Stalin remarked that “the atomic bomb is a powerful weapon meant to frighten those with weak nerves.” This observation reflected an early appreciation that the principal value of nuclear weapons lies in their political and psychological influence rather than their routine military employment.

This understanding was later articulated more systematically by nuclear strategists. Among the most influential was Bernard Brodie, who famously wrote in 1946:

“Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.”

Brodie’s statement captured the essence of nuclear deterrence: once nuclear weapons became part of international politics, the objective of military power shifted from winning wars to preventing them.

Strategists such as Thomas Schelling further refined this idea by arguing that nuclear weapons derive their strategic value primarily from the threat of their use rather than their actual employment, thereby influencing adversaries’ behavior through coercive diplomacy.

Similarly, Henry Kissinger emphasized the profound political implications of nuclear weapons in international relations. In his seminal work Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Kissinger observed:

“The classical military strategy of victory has become obsolete in the nuclear age.”

This insight highlighted the transformation of strategic thinking in the nuclear era, where the primary objective is no longer decisive battlefield victory but the management of conflict and the prevention of catastrophic escalation.

Nuclear theorist Herman Kahn further illustrated this dynamic through his concept of the “escalation ladder,” describing how conflicts may progress step by step from conventional warfare to nuclear confrontation unless carefully managed through political and diplomatic restraint.

The contemporary geopolitical environment differs significantly from the Cold War structure in which these theories emerged. Instead of a relatively stable bipolar nuclear order, today’s international system includes multiple nuclear actors, regional rivalries, and weakened arms control mechanisms. These developments increase the risk of miscalculation and complicate efforts to maintain strategic stability during crises. However, in the civilized world crossing the Rubicon is seldom expected.

One of the most significant triggers for nuclear escalation is the perception of existential threat. According to the classical strategic thought of Carl von Clausewitz, wars escalate toward extremes when the political objectives of states merge with survival.

Israel’s strategic doctrine historically reflects a deep concern about existential vulnerability. Although the country maintains nuclear ambiguity, many analysts believe that Israel possesses nuclear capabilities designed to deter catastrophic defeat. If the current war continues to drag on and heighten the imperative of survival, nuclear posturing in the worst-case scenario cannot be ruled out. At this point in time, how nuclear powers act to avert it is the key concern.

Nuclear escalation becomes more likely when conventional military capabilities fail to deter adversaries. Destruction of strategic infrastructure, leadership decapitation attempts, or attacks on nuclear facilities could create conditions in which leaders believe nuclear signaling is necessary to prevent defeat.

Such circumstances could produce the “use-it-or-lose-it” dilemma, where delaying nuclear response risks losing the ability to retaliate.

Modern warfare increasingly involves cyber warfare, artificial intelligence, and high-speed precision weapons. While these technologies enhance military capability, they also introduce new risks.

Cyber interference with early-warning systems, for example, could produce false alarms about incoming missile strikes. Under conditions of uncertainty and limited decision time, leaders might mistakenly initiate nuclear retaliation.

If the conflict spreads beyond its immediate participants, escalation risks would increase significantly. Other nuclear powers such as India, Pakistan, Russia, and China could become indirectly involved through strategic signaling or alliance commitments.

Such developments would transform a regional war into a broader geopolitical confrontation.

Another factor increasing nuclear risks today is the erosion of international arms control agreements. During the Cold War, several treaties helped stabilize nuclear competition.

These included the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the New START Treaty.

These agreements provided mechanisms for transparency, verification, and confidence-building. Their erosion has created a strategic vacuum that increases uncertainty regarding nuclear capabilities and intentions.

The Cuban Missile Crisis provides one of the most instructive examples of nuclear crisis management in history.

In October 1962, the United States discovered that the Soviet Union had deployed nuclear missiles in Cuba, capable of striking much of the American mainland. The discovery triggered a major strategic confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

President John F. Kennedy faced strong pressure from military leaders advocating an immediate air strike against the missile installations. One of the most prominent advocates of military action was Curtis LeMay, who believed decisive force was necessary to preserve American credibility.

Instead of ordering a direct attack, Kennedy adopted a strategy of controlled escalation and diplomatic negotiation. He implemented a naval blockade—referred to as a “quarantine”—around Cuba to prevent further missile deliveries while simultaneously opening secret diplomatic channels with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev.

Through backchannel negotiations, a compromise was reached. The Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its missiles from Cuba, while the United States privately committed to removing its Jupiter missiles from Turkey and pledged not to invade Cuba.

This diplomatic exchange allowed both sides to claim strategic success while avoiding nuclear war. The crisis demonstrated that careful leadership, communication, and mutual concessions can prevent catastrophic escalation even in the most dangerous circumstances.

Maintaining open communication channels between major powers remains essential for crisis management. Direct dialogue reduces the risk of misinterpretation and helps clarify strategic intentions.

International organizations such as the United Nations can facilitate negotiations, encourage ceasefires, and coordinate diplomatic initiatives.

Avoiding provocative military deployments—such as nuclear force mobilization or strategic bomber deployments—helps reduce the possibility of escalation.

Major nuclear powers must assume a stabilizing role during crises. Cooperative diplomacy among great powers can prevent regional conflicts from escalating into global nuclear confrontations.

The possibility of nuclear escalation in a prolonged West Asian conflict cannot be entirely dismissed. When states perceive that their survival is at stake, nuclear deterrence may become an integral part of strategic decision-making. However, nuclear weapons remain fundamentally political instruments whose use would produce catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences.

Historical experience demonstrates that nuclear crises are ultimately resolved through political wisdom rather than military force. The lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis highlight the importance of leadership restraint, diplomatic negotiation, and strategic compromise.

In an international system marked by multiple nuclear actors and weakened arms control regimes, the responsibility of preventing nuclear catastrophe rests not only with the belligerents but also with the broader international community. Sustained diplomacy, effective crisis management, and renewed commitment to arms control will be essential to ensure that regional conflicts do not cross the irreversible threshold of nuclear war.

References

Allison, Graham. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971.

Allison, Graham. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017.

Brodie, Bernard. The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1946.
(This is the original source of the famous quotation about the purpose of military power shifting from winning wars to preventing them.)

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Freedman, Lawrence. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. 3rd ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

Kahn, Herman. On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios. New York: Praeger, 1965.

Kissinger, Henry. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957.

Schelling, Thomas. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.

Notes from the Army War College readings. 2016/17