By Santosh Kumar Dhakal, Major General (Retd.), Nepal Army

Abstract

The ongoing crisis in West Asia has exposed the fragility of global supply chains and reaffirmed the enduring relevance of maritime strategy in shaping national security outcomes. For Nepal, a landlocked country with no naval capabilities, such disruptions generate indirect yet profound vulnerabilities. This article argues that Nepal must conceptualize its strategic posture by embracing the idea that it is “geographically landlocked but strategically maritime.” It examines the implications of evolving naval warfare, maritime chokepoint vulnerabilities, and great power competition, and proposes a framework for Nepal’s survival through diversification, diplomatic balancing, and domestic resilience.

At first glance, the notion that a landlocked country should concern itself with maritime strategy appears paradoxical. Nepal, lacking direct access to the sea and devoid of naval power, seems removed from the dynamics of maritime competition. However, the contemporary global order—defined by deeply integrated supply chains—renders such assumptions obsolete. The current crisis in West Asia, particularly around critical chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz, has underscored how disruptions at sea reverberate far beyond littoral states.

For Nepal, these disruptions are not abstract geopolitical developments but tangible threats to economic stability and national security. The flow of fuel, fertilizers, medicines, and essential goods depends overwhelmingly on maritime routes accessed through transit countries. Consequently, Nepal’s vulnerability is not direct but derivative—what may be termed a second-order maritime vulnerability, where disturbances in maritime domains translate into domestic crises.

This article contends that Nepal must internalize a fundamental strategic shift: while geographically landlocked, it is functionally and strategically maritime. Such a reconceptualization is essential for navigating an increasingly uncertain global environment.

The character of naval warfare has undergone a significant transformation. Historically, maritime dominance was achieved through decisive fleet engagements, exemplified by Admiral Horatio Nelson’s victory at the Battle of Trafalgar. Contemporary maritime strategy, however, has shifted toward network-centric warfare, emphasizing disruption over outright control.

Modern conflicts increasingly rely on Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategies, targeting logistics, supply chains, and chokepoints rather than engaging in large-scale naval battles. Control over critical maritime arteries such as the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, and the South China Sea has become a central instrument of geopolitical leverage.

In this evolving context, maritime power is neither obsolete nor invincible; it is transforming into an information-driven and networked instrument capable of shaping outcomes without direct confrontation. For countries like Nepal, the implications are profound. The threat is not military invasion but economic strangulation and logistical isolation.

Nepal’s dependence on external transit routes creates a structural vulnerability that is both geographic and geopolitical. The country relies heavily on India for access to maritime ports such as Kolkata and Visakhapatnam, while northern routes through China remain constrained by terrain and infrastructure limitations.

This dependence exposes Nepal to multiple risks:

• Supply chain disruptions caused by conflict in maritime regions
• Political blockades or friction affecting transit access
• Shortages of critical commodities, particularly energy, food and fertilizers

Such vulnerabilities are exacerbated by the erosion of international norms and the increasing willingness of states to weaponized interdependence. In such an environment, reliance on a single corridor is not merely inefficient—it is strategically dangerous.

The core challenge, therefore, is not whether Nepal can eliminate its dependence on maritime routes—it cannot—but whether it can manage and mitigate the risks associated with that dependence.

Classical geopolitical theory provides a useful lens for understanding Nepal’s difficulty. Halford Mackinder’s Heartland theory emphasized the strategic primacy of land power, while Alfred Thayer Mahan highlighted the decisive role of sea power in shaping global dominance. Together, these perspectives underscore the enduring tension between continental and maritime forces.

Nepal’s location—sandwiched between two major powers, India and China—places it at the intersection of these dynamics. While it lacks direct access to maritime space, its economic lifelines are inextricably tied to it. Thus, Nepal’s strategic reality go beyond its geography.

Moreover, contemporary geopolitics suggests that the dichotomy between land and sea is increasingly blurred. Infrastructure corridors, energy networks, and digital connectivity have created hybrid domains where disruptions in one sphere cascade into others. For Nepal, this means that maritime instability can quickly manifest as domestic economic and political stress.

To address these challenges strategic reorientation is necessary to transform itself from dependence to resilience.  Nepal must adopt a multidimensional strategy centered on resilience, redundancy, and adaptability.

Reducing dependence on a single corridor is paramount. Nepal must expand and operationalize multiple transit routes through India while accelerating northern connectivity via China. Although such ‘diversification’ may entail higher costs, its value lies in strategic redundancy rather than economic efficiency.

The establishment of national reserves of fuel, food, fertilizers, and essential medicines is critical. Historical proposals during the reign of late King Birendra, such as energy storage facilities in Panchkhal or Trishuli, warrant renewed consideration in the present context. ‘Strategic stockpiling’ serves as a buffer against external shocks and provides the state with valuable response time during crises.

In an era of rapid disruption, information is a strategic asset. Nepal should institutionalize ‘supply chain intelligence’ through dedicated centers capable of monitoring global shipping patterns, energy markets, and geopolitical developments. Early warning systems can significantly mitigate the impact of both external and strategic shocks. It is therefore essential to monitor, evaluate, and integrate available intelligence into the decision-making loop.

This can only be achieved if the government recognizes the importance of independent yet apolitical think tank institutions, such as “Eagle Think Tank,” in consistently monitoring these strategic imperatives and providing competent strategic advice and policy options to the relevant organs of the government. Such think tanks, already engaged in national security and diplomacy, can play a critical role in strengthening Nepal’s strategic preparedness.

Investment in rail, road, and dry port infrastructure is essential for enhancing logistical flexibility. A ‘multimodal’ approach reduces reliance on any single system and increases the country’s ability to adapt under stress.

In the absence of naval power, ‘diplomacy’ becomes Nepal’s primary instrument for navigating maritime challenges. This necessitates a careful balancing act between major powers while maintaining strategic autonomy.

Nepal’s experience during the Cold War offers valuable lessons. Under King Mahendra, the country successfully managed relationships with competing global powers, including the United States, the Soviet Union, India, and China. While the contemporary context differs, the principle of multi-vector diplomacy remains relevant.

Reviving the concept of Nepal as a “Zone of Peace” may also provide a framework for mitigating external pressures. By positioning itself as a neutral and stable actor, Nepal can reduce the likelihood of being drawn into great power competition.

Furthermore, ‘expanding diplomatic engagement’ with countries that influence key maritime chokepoints can enhance Nepal’s strategic options. In this sense, economic diplomacy effectively becomes Nepal’s “naval strategy,” compensating for its lack of maritime capabilities.

External strategies must be complemented by ‘internal resilience’. Nepal must prioritize energy diversification, reduce import dependency where feasible, and strengthen local production capacities.

The development of a ‘cost-conscious governance system’—lean, agile, and adaptive—is equally important. With significant financial resources held within the domestic banking system, the government must implement credible policies to channel these funds into strategic sectors.

Domestic unity and political stability are critical enablers of such reforms. Without them, even the most well-designed strategies are unlikely to succeed.

The crisis in West Asia may signal broader transformations in the global order. Historical arrangements, such as those shaped by the Sykes-Picot Agreement, may no longer hold, potentially leading to new power configurations and trade routes.

For Nepal, such shifts underscore the importance of strategic foresight. Geography, often perceived as static, can rapidly assume new strategic significance in response to geopolitical changes. Nepal must therefore remain vigilant and adaptive in its foreign policy.

The central argument of this article is straightforward: Nepal’s landlocked geography does not exempt it from maritime realities. On the contrary, it heightens its vulnerability to them. In an interconnected world, the ability to withstand maritime disruptions is a prerequisite for national stability.

Nepal cannot aspire to command the seas, nor can it emulate traditional maritime powers. However, it can—and must—develop the capacity to anticipate, absorb, and adapt to external shocks originating from maritime domains.

The analogy of Horatio Nelson and Napoleon Bonaparte is instructive not only for their contrasting styles, one a naval genius and the other a master of land warfare, but also for the outcome of the Battle of Trafalgar, where Napoleon’s enduring weakness at sea allowed Nelson’s mastery to frustrate his wider ambitions. The lesson, however, is not prescriptive for Nepal. As neither a naval power nor a continental conqueror, Nepal must draw from the deeper ‘strategic logic’ of balance, timing, and flexibility to avoid entrapment and sustain its autonomy in a complex geopolitical environment.

Ultimately, thinking through the lens of maritime strategy is not an intellectual exercise but a strategic necessity. For Nepal, survival in the twenty-first century depends not on controlling the seas, but on understanding and preparing for the ways in which others do.