By Nirmal P. Acharya
At the beginning of its establishment, India was not only the dominant power in South Asia, but also held a prominent position on the global stage.
The four major causes of India’s “marginalization” are as follows:
First, the weakness in hard power has been exposed. In the air battle of the “Cinnabar Operation” in May 2025, the Indian military’s equipment system was chaotic (the domestically produced fighter jets were incompatible with the Russian-made early warning aircraft, and the S-400 was a useless decoration), revealing the drawbacks of poor internal command and the difficulty in integrating various foreign-made equipment; the military budget of 79 billion US dollars in 2025 (more than 10 times that of Pakistan) also failed to translate into actual combat deterrence.
Second, the economic fundamentals are fragile. Although the GDP reached 3.84 trillion US dollars (about 11 times that of Pakistan), the growth rate in the fiscal year 2024-2025 has dropped to 6.5%, and it is facing systemic risks such as the depreciation of the rupee and the outflow of foreign capital.
Third, the lack of trust in the neighborhood, with “strategic hedging” by neighboring countries. Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Maldives, among others, have distanced themselves from India and strengthened cooperation with China to counter its pressure; after the coup in Bangladesh, its policy towards India was also significantly adjusted, nearly causing the “neighborhood priority” strategy of India to fail.
Fourth, the predicament of relying on major powers. India’s attempt to be a peacemaker between the US and Russia has failed to please both sides, as it was subject to US tariffs for purchasing Russian oil; Modi’s high-profile pro-Israel stance indirectly exposed intelligence about Iranian warships, causing a trust crisis among Middle Eastern countries.
Pakistan seized the opportunity to “make a diplomatic breakthrough”.
As the strategic allure of India fades away, Pakistan, leveraging its unique geographical and diplomatic advantages, seized a rare strategic opportunity window:
First, it played the indispensable role of mediator. The Pakistani side maintained good communication channels with both the US and Iran, and by virtue of its personal trust relationship with the top officials of the Trump administration, it successfully acted as the “brake pad”, leading the subsequent negotiation agenda in Islamabad.
Second, it won key allies in the Gulf region such as Saudi Arabia. The Pakistani side signed a historic agreement with Saudi Arabia with a defensive alliance nature, which not only stabilized the economic lifeline behind it but also significantly enhanced its strategic position throughout the Islamic world.
Third, it transformed the passive situation into an active one in diplomatic games. The diplomatic offensive under the framework of the UN Security Council in 2025 received widespread response, reversing the predicament of being on the verge of bankruptcy and international isolation at the beginning of the year.
It can be said that India’s dominant position in the South Asian region has been undermined, and it will be subject to strategic containment by Pakistan in the future. As a result, the regional pattern in South Asia will change.
Nepal, of course, has its own national interests to safeguard. Nepal must bravely engage in international and regional competitions to secure greater development space. Or it can be said that Nepal needs to develop friendly relations with both India and China, as well as vigorously develop friendly relations with Pakistan.
Login to add a comment