Editorial
Chinese centenary observations this round uniquely messages the wifi age with president Xi Jin Ping talking to political leaders in over 176 countries the choice of whom are equally message worthy. As it is, as a policy of the state, the Chinese have decided on a sell-well course to counter image handicaps posed on the country by Western democracies that see ominous threats in a newly competitive China. For Nepal, who Xi showcases to talk with is a message and somehow the inclusion of the RPP’s Pashupati Rana (there are three leaders of equal status in that party.) cannot be without significance. Among other things, Chinese monitoring of the political pulse in Nepal seems verily acute. And so it should. With the plenum deciding to pour so much investment in Nepal’s neighbouring Tibet and both Tibet and Jinjiang being targeted by the West against China, Nepal’s position in this emerging East-West conflict is precarious, to say the least. What is more, the almost three decades of high political instability in Nepal would surely be a factor in the Chinese boosting national capabilities on its side of the border. Let us face it, traditional Chinese foreign policy practice caught the Chinese on the wrong foot in Nepal aggravating the threat from our country sponsored by third parties.
Seeking influence in Nepal through emulation of competitors here is a far cry for effect. The West was present in Nepal since its formation while the Chinese lost their original presence over the past century or so of Chinese decline at the hands of colonists. The West is known for their Nepali clout in the Nepali intelligentsia, bureaucracy and in the past decades in the INGOs and NGOs. The Indians inherited part of that clout from the British but also invested much in the political parties and administration as also her advantage of traditional relations through Nepali mercenaries and traditional labour. The Chinese arrived big time but late. The Fifties and Sixties saw many efforts to discredit and ignore Nepal’s traditional relations with China. The relations survived, however, and the relations were highly productive. These productive relationships, in Indian parlance, were typified as Nepal’s use of the China card (at the expense of Indian relations). Unfortunately, a section of Nepali politics sought to benefit from this Indian approach and have been at the helm of affairs since the past decade by which period the Chinese found themselves at a considerable disadvantage threatening the traditional balance in Nepal. The Chinese have not caught up yet in this country. Instead what they seem to have done is to drill some sense across Nepal’s border pertaining to the effects of competing against each other in Nepal. Nepal that had allowed micro-management in its internal affairs now seems to be in the throes of outsourcing its foreign policy as well. This is no panacea for Nepali problems. The solution lies in a hands-off policy correcting the impudent effects of micromanagement.
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