By Deepak Joshi Pokhrel
A popular question is often raised in international circles: Will Nepal fall under the influence of China, or will it align with its immediate southern neighbour, India? This question has always remained at the core of geopolitical discussions within and outside the country. At the same time, it has attracted the sustained attention of the United States and Russia, which have extended their support to help Nepal become a prosperous nation. But they, too, pursue their own interests, validating the saying that there is no such thing as a free lunch in this world.
Nestled between two Asian powerhouses—China and India—with significant disparities in economic and military strength, Nepal has been acutely conscious of safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Nepalis take immense pride in their history of never having been colonised, making Nepal one among the oldest nations in the world.
In addition, Nepal has maintained a delicate equilibrium between its two immediate neighbours and its international partners. It has clearly sent a loud and clear message that Nepal does not prioritise Beijing over New Delhi, or vice versa. Despite this, Nepal’s position vis-à-vis India and China often comes under public scrutiny.
There is no gainsaying the fact that geopolitical competition in Nepal is most apparent in five areas: political influence; connectivity and critical infrastructure; markets; resources; and security. This is why our political leaders and decision-makers are under immense pressure to make decisions that suit the interests of the so-called heavyweights in these key areas.
In the recent past, China has sought to cultivate close ties with political parties, especially left-wing parties, and has encouraged greater independence from India. This is evident from the fact that Beijing played a crucial behind-the-scenes role in bringing two communist parties—the CPN-UML and the Maoist Centre—together shortly before the 2017 general election. But Beijing’s efforts to keep the two communist leaders—KP Sharma Oli and Prachanda—together were in vain. The reason: Oli and Prachanda’s lust for power.
Furthermore, through strategies such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has been trying to expand its footprint in Nepal. In 2017, China and Nepal formally agreed to cooperate under the BRI by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The MoU covers infrastructure connectivity, trade, investment, transport and other areas. Of course, Nepal remains committed to the BRI. But its implementation has been very slow and limited.
Some scholars quietly contend that Beijing has been encouraging Kathmandu to reduce its strategic dependence on and engagement with New Delhi. In their view, Beijing seeks to prevent Nepal from becoming a platform for Indian or Western interests, particularly in relation to Tibet and China’s southwestern frontier. While political pundits were assuming that Beijing-Kathmandu relations had reached a new height, Beijing surprised everyone by agreeing to resume trade with India through the Lipulekh Pass, a disputed territory.
On the other side of the coin, India’s interest in Nepal dates back to the early 1990s, following the restoration of multiparty democracy in Nepal. The political transition paved the way for Indian upper hand in politics and micromanagement in Nepal, with New Delhi strengthening its influence in all sectors. Since then, Nepal-India relations have seen many ups and downs. It is anybody’s guess whether India’s big-brotherly attitude contributed to this development!
Over the years, the New Delhi administration has been accused of being involved in making and breaking governments through its favoured leaders in Nepal. India also blames Nepal, saying that Kathmandu plays the China card against India—something that is not only understandable but deplorable as well. As a result, it discourages Kathmandu’s engagement with Beijing. One manifestation of this is India’s refusal to purchase hydroelectricity generated by projects developed under Chinese auspices.
Critics say that India invokes the narrative of a special relationship to influence Nepal’s domestic and foreign policies, expecting Kathmandu to align its decisions with New Delhi’s strategic interests. Consequently, many perceive the notion of a special relationship not merely as a reflection of historical, cultural and geographical ties but also as a diplomatic instrument.
As an emerging regional power, India has to compete with China, which has become the world’s second-largest economy, after the United States. India needs green energy to meet the demands of its ever-expanding infrastructure and economy. With limited water resources, India has always viewed Nepal’s abundant water resources and hydropower potential as strategically important.
Beyond water resources, India’s interest is also shaped by security concerns. India and Nepal share a long and porous border. This has always remained an issue of concern for the New Delhi administration. The reason is simple: the open border offers ample space for terrorist and anti-India groups to enter India and carry out terrorist activities.
Experiences from the past show that geopolitical competition is also about tapping raw materials and natural resources. Nepal has resources that both China and India need to pursue their economic growth. This is where Nepal needs to be very careful and move cautiously.
In the rapidly changing global order, power has been shifting from a unipolar to a multipolar world. The Balen-led government cannot and should not refrain from diplomatic engagement with Beijing, New Delhi, Washington or Moscow. After assuming office, Balen, departing from past practice, refused to meet Kathmandu-based ambassadors individually. Instead, he held a collective meeting with them—something that was praised by people from all walks of life.
However, he initially refused to meet the Indian and Chinese envoys individually. No doubt, this was a welcome move on the part of the prime minister. But given Nepal’s strategic location, the country is likely to face difficulties in pursuing its economic and political growth if it fails to maintain cordial relations with its two immediate neighbours. Prime Minister Balen seems to have understood this simple truth, and, as a result, he met the Indian and Chinese envoys separately on the same day.
At present, Nepal is making rapid strides in economic growth. It needs both China and India in its pursuit of development. In plain words, it cannot distance itself from Beijing while intensifying its engagement with New Delhi, and vice versa. This is a simple truth that Nepal needs to understand and adhere to.
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