From Far & Near
By Shashi P.B.B. Malla
India’s Failure as a Regional Power
After independence in 1947, India was determined to establish its pre-eminence in South Asia. It experienced a rude awakening after its catastrophic defeat in the October/November 1962 border war. It was also a watershed moment for all the other countries with repercussions until today.
The concept of ‘the Indian Sub-Continent’ became outdated, and the war heralded China’s emergence as a South Asian power. Notwithstanding its victories over Pakistan, the other countries all rejected India’s attempts to be the dominant power, interfering unnecessarily in their domestic affairs. It would have been another matter if the inspired Indian leadership had attempted to be ‘the first among equals’. Instead they considered themselves of having inherited the British imperial mantle!
The Changed South Asian Constellation
Pakistan is today firmly in the Chinese camp, but the ongoing Sino-Indian border conflict – which is slowly but certainly expanding also into a trade war – is forcing the other countries of South Asia to make unenviable choices. All are on the horns of a dilemma.
Smaller countries in South Asia have sought to avoid being dragged into the hostilities between New Delhi and Beijing. It is becoming harder and harder to maintain this neutrality.
The tense border standoff between China and India has forced their neighbours in South Asia to tread cautiously to avoid the crossfire between the nuclear armed great powers.
In the South Asian constellation of vital interests there is also the never-ending India-Pakistan existential conflict, and also the United States’ thrust in the region with its Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) of which the emerging Quadrangle of Indo-Pacific Powers (United States, India, Japan and Australia) is an integral part and is only a thinly-veiled alliance or axis in their containment of the rising superpower. The South Asian region has, therefore, become a veritable political and diplomatic minefield.
Iran in the extreme west of the region may not be ideally part of South Asia. However, principally in cultural, geo-political and economic terms it is nevertheless tangentially part of South Asia and is intimately connected to Pakistan and Afghanistan – also sharing borders.
In the far east, Myanmar is also a border case – regarding its affiliation to the Region South Asia. But it does have sensitive borders impinging on India’s north-eastern states and Bangladesh [above all the unsolved and festering problem of the Rohingya refugees making it a humanitarian crisis of the first order].
China is also constructing a passageway from its southern Yunnan province through Myanmar to a new port on the Arakan coast in the Bay of Bengal/Indian Ocean. This new route would completely bypass the Strait of Malacca for China’s vital trade with the Middle East and Europe, or at least reduce its dependence. It would also challenge India’s superior position in the Indian Ocean. It would also nullify the strategic location of the Andaman & Nicobar Islands guarding the entrance to the Strait of Malacca.
The other remaining smaller countries in South Asia – Nepal, the Maldives and Sri Lanka, as well as Bangladesh have sought to stay above the fray between New Delhi, which has historical influence, but not supremacy – inherited from the British Raj, and Beijing, which through its proximity to the Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions, is the new power in South Asia. It has also invested heavily here, above all in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar.
It will be extremely difficult to maintain this neutrality [with the exception of Pakistan which is completely opposed toIndia] – all will be walking a tightrope and all require to cultivate diplomatic finesse.
Bhutan: A Special Case& Chinese Overreach?
For Bhutan, the last Himalayan kingdom, landlocked by Tibet/China in the north and India in the west (the former Himalayan kingdom Sikkim), south and east (Arunachal Pradesh), there have also been tensions over Chinese claims to Doklam and Beijing’s [unnecessary] opposition to an environmental project at the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary, under Bhutanese sovereignty.
Beijing claimed at a June meeting of the Global Environment Facility that the sanctuary was part of disputed territory between China and Bhutan, although this had never been raised in Bhutan’s previous boundary negotiations with China!
Jeff Smith, a research fellow on South Asia at the Washington-based Heritage Foundation noted: “It appeared for a time as if China was attempting to court Bhutan, and drive a wedge between Thimpu and New Delhi, but this claim will probably put an end to that charm offensive as the wolf warriors [the Young Turks or new “Red Guards” of Chinese diplomacy] again seize the day and undermine decades of more cautious diplomacy” (SCMP).
India Changes Course
Most in India are now advocating a fundamental transformation of its relationship with China. But that is the crux of the problem: it will have to go it alone, and it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible for India to convince any other country – save Bhutan, and that too grudgingly – to re-evaluate their own relations with China.
Geeta Kochar, Assistant Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi (JNU), therefore, looks at these multifarious relations purely through rose-tinted Indian lens when she maintains: “The greater tension between India and China has changed the balance of the relationship where each state looks at China with a greater sense of fear and anxiety.”She also conveniently ignores her own country’s convoluted relations with each state, which time and again has had to face the wrath of a country which considers itself the successor of the British Raj with all its airs and authority, i.e. the dominant power in and around South Asia.
The Sino-Indian border standoff has influenced anti-Chinese sentiment inside India, with the Indian government banning 59 Chinese apps amid calls to boycott Chinese goods and restrict Chinese investments. No other country will follow suit, in fact there is a wall of silence in this regard – no country wants to dig its own grave!
Sumit Ganguly, a professor of political science at Indiana University, U.S. claims that anti-China sentiments are not a result of the humiliation of 1962. In fact, the catastrophic defeat must have carried on in the national consciousness. Surely, bureaucrats, writers and intellectuals, the political class, and above all the military could not have had ‘national amnesia’!
Most countries of South Asia will seek to maintain as neutral and non-aligned in such a tone and position as possible to avoid annoying/angering Beijing or New Delhi. They have absolutely no motivation to follow calls in India to boycott Chinese goods and services, and in any case, are not in a strong economic position to impose punitive economic measures on China.
The two smaller South Asian countries, Nepal and Bhutan, unlike the other countries of the region, share borders with both India and China [as does Pakistan, which, however, is allied with China in all but name] and have long had to balance between the two major powers. The security paradigm has become extremely fluid, with a shift in recent years to court opportunities from China.
Thus, the Indian analyst Kochar’s Delphic warning: “Nothing comes free of cost, and they [all the countries of South Asia]will face challenges in choices they make for the future, especially when the peace between India and China is changing to greater confrontation, rather than just competition.
Expert Chinese Opinion
Zhang Jia dong, a former Chinese diplomat in India and currently professor at Fudan University in Shanghai said that deteriorating Sino-Indian relations would “not necessarily” compel countries to choose sides.” Furthermore: “As long as there is balance of power between China and India there will be space for these South Asian countries and they will not be forced to choose.” (SCMP)
Liu Zongyi, secretary general of the South Asia and China Centre at the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies opined that “If Modi can’t control the voices calling for retaliation against China, there is no telling when there will be peace.” However, he is hopeful that he would not let the “rampant Hindu nationalism” fervor lead India into a war with China. “Modi wants to use this nationalist sentiment, but he is also scared of the blowback it might cause.” (SCMP)
Nepal’s Unique Position & Role
Nepal is the oldest nation in South Asia [and even older than the United States!]. The Father of the Nation, Prithvi Narayan Shah had an historical mission and vision and instinctively realized that the newly-established land-locked country’s strategy for survival [first coined by Leo E. Rose, the foremost American authority on the politics of Nepal] could only be a delicate balancing act between two powerful and paramount Asian powers.
Long before the other Asian nations came into existence [only Japan, Korea and Mongolia were older], Nepal had been utilizing the so-called ‘China Card’ against would-be predators.
Henry Kissinger, the master doyen of practical grand strategy and statecraft notes admiringly: “Nepal skillfully balanced its diplomatic posture between the ruling dynasties in China and those in India – offering letters and gifts that were interpreted as tribute in China [the arduous quinquennial tribute missions undertaken overland on foot] but recorded as evidence of equal exchanges in Nepal, then holding out a special tie with China as a guarantee of Nepal’s independence” [vide: “World Order. Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History, 2014, p. 179].
Prithvi Narayan had laid down the ground rules and his more perspicacious successor rulers and national decision-makers had followed through – Maharaja Jung Bahadur Rana, Maharaja Sir Chandra Shumsher, Maharajadhiraja Mahendra and Maharajadhiraja Birendra.
During the portentous 1962 Sino-Indian border war, Nepal remained strictly neutral and neither its territory nor air space was allowed to be used by either warring power.
Nepal adopted this policy although Nepalese Gurkhas in the Indian Army fought [with great bravery and distinction] on both fronts – in Ladakh and the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA/later Arunachal Pradesh). Many were captured because of military blunders by Indian Corps Commander Lt.Gen. B.M. Kaul [vide: Ramachandra Guha: India After Gandhi, 2007; pp. 330 f.]. The Gurkha POWs were treated most courteously.
Nepal’s unique foreign policy of ‘equi-distance’ has been meticulously and brilliantly documented by Mana RanjanJosse, the pre-eminent political journalist and deputy ambassador to the United Nations [including the UN Security Council]. Extolling the Great King’s contribution to the foundation and continued existence of Nepal as a sovereign state, he writes: “…without Prithvinarayan’s foresight and military prowess Nepal’s fate would not have been very different from those in India that befell prey to British imperialism. Nepali nationalism and modern Nepal’s inexorable quest for security must, therefore, be assessed from such a starting point” [vide: “Nepal’s Quest for Survival in a Challenging Geopolitical Setting”, NEFAS/Nepal Foundation for Advanced Studies, 2020; p. 34].
Sri Lankan Viewpoint
Asanga Abeyagoonasekera, a former director general of a national security think tank in Sri Lanka said that recent developments will impact regional security and minimize strategic space since the bilateral border conflict expanded into a trade and economic war. (SCMP)
India, China and the U.S. have been vying for strategic influence/domination/supremacy in the Indian Ocean, which is the domain to key commercial waterways, particularly for the world’s oil and gas trade.
For Sri Lanka, its geo-strategic position in that triangular power space will mean more external pressure in the coming years.
China’s Potent Presence in the Indian Ocean
Notwithstanding the emerging ‘Quadrangle of Powers’ [UJIA/United States, Japan, India and Australia] axis as an integral part of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, China has already steadily built up its geo-political presence in the Indian Ocean, to bolster its own string of infrastructure projects and commercial hubs comprising the…Maritime… (BRI)
Its string of commercial centres [and military bases?] stretching from its new port under construction in Myanmar to Colombo and further on to its base in Djibouti [between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somaliland in the Horn of Africa] overlooking the narrow entrance Bab el Mandeb commanding the approaches to the Red Sea and further to the Suez Canal connecting to the Mediterranean Sea.
China can, therefore, elegantly bypass the Strait of Malacca in future, and make the ‘Guardians’ of the Strait – the Indian Andaman & Nicobar Islands — superfluous!
The same can be said of the British base in the British Indian Ocean Territory of the Chagos Archipelago/Diego Garcia Island – too south of the main shipping lanes to have any commanding position.
The current constellation of powers in the South Asian landmass and the Indian Ocean represent the non-aligned cluster and a grouping aligned against China alone. The vital question remains whether China has overstretched its resources.
The writer can be reached at: shashipbmalla@hotmail.com
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