Review of World Affairs

Iran Regime Got the US All Wrong

By Shashi P.B.B. Malla

According to the former Commander of the US Central Command, General Kenneth F. McKenzie , Jr., for decades, Iran managed to bluff American presidents.

He sets out his opinion piece in the New York Times (March 4).

It deterred attacks from a superpower and carried out proxy campaigns against its neighbours.

The recent US strikes on Iran are evidence that this long-term strategy of negotiating in bad faith is bankrupt.

The US military campaign underway is the direct result of Iranian leaders’ foot-dragging, obfuscation and delay tactics.

This time, Gen McKenzie writes, they totally misjudged Trump.

The situation today began back in 2020, when Trump made the decision to strike then Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, the prominent military leader who masterminded attacks against American people and facilities in the Middle East.

Since his death, Iran has been unable to recover the coherence and purpose of General Suleiman’s proxy operations.

Most important, the strike established Trump’s credentials as someone who would not be in thrall to Iran.

The president thus has the unique advantage in the region.

For the first time in decades, American military power deployed against Iran is coupled with a commander in chief who isn’t afraid to use it.

For decades, the primary goal of Iranian statecraft has been regime preservation.

The generation of the 1970s though aging, still aims to pass the torch at home and export it abroad in the form of militant Shia Islam.

Iran’s leaders seem to believe that keeping the revolutionary fire alive is their biggest priority, and they respond only to direct and unambiguous pressure on the regime.

During the Iraq-Iran war of the 1980s, for instance, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomenei, then the supreme leader, “drank from the poisoned chalice,” as he put it, and accepted a truce with Iraq under adverse circumstances to preserve the clerical regime in Iran.

The weekend’s American and Israeli strikes apply more direct pressure than the regime has faced at almost any time in its history.

The death of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is a profoundly significant event.

US forces will continue to hit targets inside Iran and simultaneously reduce its ability to respond.

The military does this by striking leadership nodes and by seeking out and destroying Iranian missile storage areas, transporters and launch sites.

American has practiced these missions for years.

The early Iranian responses against US bases and cities in the region were most certainly pre-arranged, with local commanders given the authority to open fire in the event of an attack.

It will almost certainly get increasing hard for the Iranian military to continue this pressure, particularly as condemnation of Iran continues to flow from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan and other states.

On the so-called escalation ladder – the concept war planners have used for decades to evaluate how a conflict might evolve – Iran still has options, but they are all in the low end.

At the high end of the escalation ladder, all of the options are America’s (NYT).

Iran can use asymmetric tactics to fight back.

Almost the most radical would be to mine the Strait of Hormuz, which it has the capability to do.

This would block global energy traffic and spike oil prices, and would take time to fix.

Tehran could also unleash its global terror network, which while depleted since October 7, 2023 still exists and can reach well beyond the region, including into the United States.

General McKenzie concedes there are real risks to the global economy and America’s national security.

It’s become a platitude in Washington to say that regime change in Iran has become impossible because the current leadership has removed all possible alternatives in the most brutal ways imaginable (NYT).

It is, of course, difficult to predict the longevity of totalitarian regimes under pressure.

Few saw the Syrian collapse coming.

Sustained lethal pressure on the regime may provide an avenue for alternatives to emerge.

Or the brutal regime might survive.

However, one thing is certain: Without pressure, nothing will change.

There is opportunity in the death of the supreme leader.

Gen. McKenzie writes that the United States should not squander this moment, when Iran is uniquely weak, and vulnerable and the United States holds all the advantages.

America can also seek to return to negotiations. But this around it should be between victor and vanquished.

Washington should require Tehran to