By Shashi P.B.B. Malla

Before Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the debate among observers centered on whether his actions and bluster were merely for show.

Lawrence Freedman, a leading analyst and then professor of war studies at King’s College, London, thought an invasion was unlikely, but did not think so because Putin had said it would not happen.

Freedman knew better than rely on his denials.

But he also knew that an invasion would be an absurd undertaking (NYT, Oct. 9).

Freedman thought that the Ukrainians would surely fight back and they would be supported by the United States and Europe.

Russia could inevitably get bogged down in a long and bitter armed conflict from which Putin would struggle immensely to extricate Russia and its army.

In retrospect, Putin’s invasion turned out to be a terrible idea.

Now, nearly five years later, Putin’s hybrid attacks on Europe have become increasingly brazen.

Having miscalculated so badly then, Friedman speculates whether Putin could make an even greater miscalculation now and take his overstretched, battle-weary army into another, potentially bigger war (NYT).

Friedman poses the question whether Putin could be desperate enough to avoid a humiliating defeat in Ukraine that he would be willing to raise the stakes on his original bet.

According to Friedman, it would be another absurd undertaking, but it cannot be absolutely ruled out.

Last month, a Russian drone struck a passenger train near the Ukrainian border with Poland shortly after a train carrying Boris Johnson, the former UK prime minister, and other European dignitaries had just departed.

And General David Petraeus, a former CIA director was still at the train station when the attack took place.

The German government has said that Russia was behind a drone carrying explosives that was found close to a Ukrainian cargo plane in Leipzig/Halle airport in eastern Germany in early August.

There have also been Russian reconnaissance drone flights over sensitive targets.

Facilities connected with industries supplying arms to Ukraine have been surveyed, and on occasion, attacked.

The term “hybrid” is often used to refer to non-military activities – for example, cyber attacks and misinformation – that are designed to probe red lines and destabilize their targets.

By keeping attacks deniable and below the threshold of a full war, Russia can make a political point and create a sense of threat without triggering a military retaliation.

But according to Freedman, the current Russian campaign is getting uncomfortably close to the edge, as attacks attributed to Moscow have caused significant damage.

Some of these could have resulted in significant loss of life. And that they have not seems to be a question of good luck more than anything else.

“The Russians are playing this game because they are desperate to bring the war with Ukraine to an end on their terms.

Europe’s continuing financial and military support for Ukraine is seen as a barrier to victory.

Putin is becoming more blatant in his warnings and brazen in his actions to get the Europeans off their support” (Friedman).

Russian forces may have struggled to defeat a much smaller country.

However, Putin believes that the conflict with NATO is deep and existential and goes beyond Ukraine.

At some point this larger conflict may come to a head, and there are arguments inside Russia for not waiting.

With European rearmament still at its early stages, Russia could strike before the alliance is capable of a full response.

Such a strike need not be total war and could instead be a limited move against one of the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), for which Russia could have sufficient forces.

Estonia has been mentioned as a ‘prime candidate’.

Friedman surmises that Putin could calculate that any attack would put NATO in a state of shock, its members dithering about whether to trigger Article 5 (‘an attack on one, is an attack on all’ and mutual defence is necessary).

This would ultimately weaken political will in Europe for supporting Ukraine.

The United States, with Trump in charge, would be expected to do little or nothing at all.

It is well known that Trump doesn’t like NATO, and is chummy with Putin.

Friedman is of the opinion that there is no need at the present moment for endless speculation about Putin’s plans.

European countries should follow the same policies, with or without American participation.

1.  European leaders should be prepared to call out Russia and be candid with their citizens about these dangers, the nature of the struggle and how Russian threats are best addressed.
2.  They must better defend against attacks at whatever level they occur, which requires stepping up intelligence efforts and accelerating rearmament plans.
3. To demonstrate that Russian efforts will fail, they should give Ukraine even more support.

Trump has indicated that he envisages a completely different trajectory.

Even while his so-called envoys, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner were meeting with Ukrainian officials in Miami to discuss proposals to end the war, Trump abruptly announced plans that Russia would start supplying diesel to the world market.

This was in stark contrast to a sweeping Russian sanctions law he signed last month that aimed at clamping down on the oil and gas revenues that fuel Russia’s war against Ukraine.

This was definitely a stab in the back for Ukraine, and Zelenskyy reacted accordingly.

He said Russia would repay it “with further terror and perfidy.”

He framed it as an investment in the war that could prolong it.

Trump, the thin-skinned strongman, also reacted to Zelenskyy’s critique by saying that Ukraine is badly in need of a new leadership!

If all the polls in the U.S. are correct, in less than four weeks, Trump himself will be reduced to a lame-duck president in the last two years of his second term as president – and the world will breathe a sigh of relief for the end of his evil machinations.

The writer can be reached at:

shashimalla125@gmail.com     

And even if the Ukrainian army was defeated, they would resist subjugation tooth and nail.

Freedman and others thought that Putin would