By P Kharel
Nepal’s two giant neighbours, China and India, are visibly and audibly drawn to cold vibes in their relationship. They are increasingly engaged in firing salvoes against each other.
In the latest incident, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi provoked a sharp reaction from Beijing after he visited Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as its territory and calls it “South Tibet”—an area covering 3,800 sq km. Modi inaugurated development projects, including a strategic tunnel, during the visit. Situated at a height of 13,000 feet, the 1.5 Sela Tunnel is designed to facilitate speedier deployment of troops and military hardware.
When China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs this month announced that it had “standardised” the names of 11 places in the disputed territory, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar grimly described the situation in Ladakh as “fragile and dangerous”. New Delhi plans to increase the number of troops by 10,000 along the Line of Actual Control on the border with the communist neighbour, even as a four-year stand-off with the People’s Liberation Army of China continues.
Stiff standoff: Apart from a war in 1962, the two nuclear-powered neighbours have been involved in frequent border clashes, of late. Twenty Indian soldiers and four Chinese troops were killed in a 2020 skirmish in the Ladakh region on the western part of their border. Near the border between Sikkim and Tibet, too, similar clashes occurred. Although not officially admitted, India lost 2,000 sq km of territory since the 2020 summer.
Meantime, tax officials raided Chinese firms operating in India. New Delhi banned the TikTok media platform and many China-made mobile applications. However, the hunger of consumers in India for Chinese goods is indicated by the bilateral trade having reached $100bn a year with a significant surplus in Beijing’s favour.
Its economy heavily reliant on tourism, the Maldives is virtually boycotted by Indians after the archipelago demanded that New Delhi recall its troops. Although China remained unusually a cold bystander in foreign play in the neighbourhood, including Nepal, it signals a new approach now. An editorial in the Global Times tabloid recently warned: “India should not underestimate China’s opposition to unilateral military intervention. Without UN empowerment, [if] India one-sidedly sends troops to the Maldives, China will take action to stop New Delhi.”
The Modi government has stepped up political and economic engagement with Taiwan—the island territory that Beijing considers to be its renegade region. When Taiwan elected Tsai Ing-wen in 2016 as the island’s first woman president, New Delhi refrained from sending any delegation to Tsai Ing-wen’s inaugural. Four years later, after Tsai won re-election, New Delhi’s political considerations had changed. Modi saw fit to dispatch two Indian lawmakers to attend her oath-taking ceremony virtually as the coronavirus pandemic took hold worldwide.
Taiwan card: India’s ties with Taiwan have steadily deepened. Bilateral trade surged from just over US$1 billion to US$7 billion in 2021. In July, a third Taipei Economic and Cultural Center, a de facto consulate for Taiwan, opened in Mumbai. New Delhi shrugs off caution not to fuel crisis over Taiwan engagement. It has encouraged Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company to establish a fabrication plant in India. Beyond trade and investment, a labour deal is in the offing.
A labour agreement is on the cards for more than 10,000 Indian workers to find jobs in Taiwan, whose deputy education minister led a delegation to several Indian universities, “underscoring” the “commitment to strengthening educational collaboration with the country”. To Beijing’s anger, the collaborations have broadened to defence conversations, too. In August, three former top Indian military officials attended a security dialogue held by Taiwanese authorities in Taipei.
In an apparent reaction, the Global Times suggested to the China government to rethink the recognition given to Sikkim as a state of India, adding that more than 80 per cent of Sikkimese wanted their state to be an independent country.
Modi had already made overtures to Taiwan, when he visited the island in 1999 as BJP’s general secretary. In 2011, as chief minister of Gujarat, he hosted a Taiwanese delegation. And the next year, officials from Taiwan attended a global conference in the state that sought foreign investment.
Towards the brink: In June 2020, the world’s two most populous countries were involved in a fight between their military personnel along the disputed border, which led to the deaths of at least 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers.
India faces the world’s longest hostile territorial boundary of 3,400 km separating it with China. Its Home Affairs Minister Amit Shah lamented that “hostile forces” were using the “borders of friendly countries like Nepal, and Bhutan borders to push infiltrators” from 24 countries. New Delhi plans to increase troop levels at the Line of Actual Control. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned that sending more troops would “not help ease the situation”. Rajnath Singh, defence minister: The Indian Army is equipped to give a “befitting reply” to anyone who “casts an evil eye” on the country’s borders.
India demands deferential treatment and priority from its smaller neighbours—an attitude critics liken to imperial rule during British India colonial centuries. In its ambitions to emerge as a major global power, or at least an undisputed super heavyweight influencer in South Asia, India should exercise restraint in overstretching itself beyond the ground reality. Geography does not change, but politics and power equations do.
Clearly, India is slowly but surely committing self-isolation amid a well of dissatisfaction and anger from its diverse and more assertive neighbourhood. The situation is fraught with serious risks to regional peace and India’s ambitions.
This scribe is in the know that an international network of “patriots”, irrespective of ideology, is expanding rapidly. Its Asian branch stretches from the Far East through South Asia and West Asia. Another mechanism is being developed locally in individual countries where Western “money power” has stifled the local voices for independence and cultural pride.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect People’s Review’s editorial stance.
Login to add a comment