*Myanmar Crisis: Major Gains of the Resistance
* India Flexing Naval Power & Competition With China
By Shashi P.B.B. Malla
Military Junta Under Pressure in Myanmar
The relative prosperity of the commercial metropolis Yangon [ the former capital Rangoon ] stands in strong contrast to the escalating conflict in the rest of the country, such as along the border with China’s Yunnan , province, where rebel forces have mounted successful offensives. But a darker mood can be detected in the outer districts of Yangon itself (Nikkei Asia).
Just ahead of the third anniversary of the army putsch, there was a pervasive sense among people in Yangon that some kind of change was looming.
Far less certain is what that will mean for the regime , the myriad ethnic groups, the parallel National Unity Government (NUG) and the
The United Nations estimates that about two-thirds of Myanmar is mired in conflict.
More than 2.6 million people have been internally displaced, including many hundreds of thousands who fled after several ethnic resistance groups launched Operation 1027 [ i.e. October the 27th ], a series of sweeping coordinated attacks across the north and north-east in late October.
The rebel offensive received the implicit backing of China, which wanted to crack down on clusters of scam centres that were operated by Chinese-linked criminal gangs on the Myanmar side of their border and had been tolerated or even protected by the Myanmar military.
The attacks galvanized other resistance forces across areas dominated by both ethnic minorities and the majority Bamar, also known as Burmans.
At least 34 towns have fallen to the rebel groups, and several more are under threat.
In many areas, education and health services are as scant as food and drinking water, posing an acute challenge for whoever is in charge.
“Deepeninbg violence, rising poverty levels, and deteriorating living conditions are having a devastating impact on people’s lives,” stated the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in a report in January.
The World Food Programme estimated last June that 25 % percent of the population was suffering from food insecurity and nearly a third needed humanitarian assistance.
The economy is likely to grow by only 1 % percent this year, according to the World Bank, and inflation has clearly exceeded the bank’s estimate of 20 % percent, judging from the prices of staples such as rice and fuel in Yangon.
The resistance’s gains from Operation 1027 have been credited to ethnic armed groups seeking autonomy.
The NUG and its network of People’s Defence Force (FDC) units, which are aligned with the deposed civilian government of State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, are fighting alongside the ethnic armed groups and also operating separately in the Bamar heartlands centered on Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay.
A small number of urban units in the big cities are also staging assassinations against regime officials and carrying out drone and bomb attacks on official facilities.
Although the NUG is training local administrators, its presence on the ground is sometimes uncertain. “Central Myanmar villages are dominated by a confusing web of often-overlapping resistance groups, where allegiance to NUG is extremely variable,” said Adrian Rovel, an independent Myanmar analyst.
The rapid progress by the resistance forces has fueld perceptions that regime forces are beginning to crumble, despite their aerial and artillery firepower that has levelled more than 80,000 homes and public buildings in three years.
Nearly 3,000 army soldiers surrendered in the northeastern town of Laukkai near the Chinese border in late 2023.
The military regime responded to the defeat by sentencing three of the brigadier generals involved to death and imprisoning three others.
The harsh sentences could backfire, said Maj. Naung Yo of People’s Goal, which is supporting mil,itary defectors. “They think harsh sentences will scare soldiers, but in fact it has shocked middle-ranked officers” and destroyed their trust in the top leadership.
He claimed that more than 6,000 of the regime’s soldiers have joined the resistance forces and many thousands more have surrendered or deserted.
Even so, the defeat of the military regime, or State Administrative Council, “is not a binary question,” stressed one Yangon-based analyst. “This won’t be Saigon 1975 – the SAC is not simply going to collapse overnight.”
The regime extended its six-month period of emergency rule, which expired last week.
Sooner or later, it may rename itself and attempt to “civilianize” its image, with SAC chief Senior General Min Aung Hliang taking on a loftier prime minister role.
There is also revived talk of elections, initially promised in early 2022.
Yet none of that, say analysts in Yangon, will really alter the dynamics.
“The only game changer will be when the regime simply can’t function, and that could be a year or much more,” said one Asian diplomat in Yangon to Nikkei Asia.
According to Avinash Paliwal, Reader in International Relations at SOAS University of London, “Myanmar could be on the cusp of rewriting its social contract along federal lines. The resilience, coordination, tactical innovation, and strategic gains of the resistance are unprecedented” (Foreign Affairs, Jan. 24).
Nothing can be ruled out in a country like Myanmar, but Rovel the analyst said the regime maintains a firm hold on the capital Naypyitaw . “The whole city was designed with military logic at the core; that’s where all the high-tech armaments and the best commandos remain stationed,” he said. “The resistance doesn’t have the firepower and even the critical manpower to really take it on.”
Yangon and Mandalay are also expected to remain in the military’s hands for now.
In the long term, added Rovel, there are major concerns about a fragmentation of Myanmar.
“Post-SAC Myanmar will be dominated by powerful, well-armed ethnic armed organizations, with territories larger than ever, and with a clear divide between Chinese-affiliated ones and the others. The NUG might still be around, but with influence only on the lowlands, and little leverage over the ethnic groups.”
“Most probably, the [ethnic organizations] will push for a federal system, which would benefit them, which would trigger tensions with the Bamar political forces, especially the remnants of the National League for Democracy,”Suu Kyi’s party.
But he warned, “if no credible inclusive body manages to bring all those [disparate] forces around the table and have proper political dialogue, the risk of a breakup of Myanmar should be taken seriously.”
As long as the SAC has the reins of the central bank and state apparatus, there will be some semblance of control, said a Yangon-based manufacturing executive.
“Highways might be blocked, border trading posts might fall to the resistance, but as long as manufacturing and business continues in Yangon and shipping ports and airports function, the economy – and the regime – can survive,” he said.
Myanmar is heavily reliant on trade, which accounted for nearly 73 % percent of gross domestic product in 2022, according to the World Bank.
The recent fighting has disrupted trade with China and Thailand, with imports falling nearly to zero at some border posts, prompting a shift to sea routes.
Central to neighbouring Thailands strategy is to bring the unpopular regime back into the regional diplomatic fold by persuading the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to soften its position on barring Myanmar from high-level meetings.
In the Yangon bubble, commerce is thriving.
Indeed, as one Western visitor recently put it, the atmosphere bin Yangon is “shockingly normal” for a country increasingly portrayed as a quagmire of violence and anarchy. (Nikkei Asia).
India As a Naval & Rising Great Power
For decades, India has focused its defence policy on its land borders with rivals Pakistan and China.
Now, as its global ambitions expand, it is beginning to flex its naval power in international waters, including anti-piracy patrols and a widely publicized deployment close to the Red Sea to help protect ships from attacks during Israel’s war on Hamas (AP/Associated Press, Feb. 3).
India sent three guided missile destroyers and reconnaissance aircraft in last year when Yemen-based Houthi militants began targeting ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden in solidarity with Hamas, causing disruptions in a key trading route through the Suez Canal that handles about 12 % percent of global trade.
India as a “Proactive Contributor” to International Maritime Stability
The deployment highlights the country as a “proactive contributor” to international maritime stability, said Vice Admiral Anil Kumar Chawla, who retired in 2021 as head of India’s southern naval command.
“We are not doing it only out of altruism. Unless you are maritime power you can never aspire to be a global power”, Chawla said (AP).
India already a regional power in South Asia, is positioning itself ‘as a global player today, an upcoming global power,’ he said.
India is widely publicizing the deployments, signaling its desire to assume wider responsibility in maritime security to the world and its growing maritime ambitions to regional rival China.
“It is a message to China that, look, we can deploy such a large force here. This is our backyard. Though we don’t own it, but we are probably the most capable and responsible resident naval power,” Chawla said.
The Indian navy has helped at least four ships, three of which were attacked by Houthi rebels and another that Washington blamed on Iran, a charge denied by Tehran.
It has also conducted several anti-piracy missions.
China’s Presence in the Indian Ocean
Beijing has deepened its engagement in the Indian Ocean mainly through infrastructure deals with India’s closest neighbours, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and most recently the Maldives.
“The Chinese are looking for more and more naval bases in the extended Indian Ocean,” said Lt.Gen. D.S. Hooda, a former Indian military officer and now a strategic expert.
“Seeing that, India doesn’t have any other option but to keep building its own” (AP).
Experts say the growing competition with China is energizing India to acquire more advanced ships, submarines and aircraft and invest more in technology and infrastructure.
The Quad: The Indo-Pacific Strategic Alliance
India, the U.S., Australia and Japan are members of the Indo-Pacific strategic alliance known as the Quad, which has repeatedly accused China of flexing its military muscles in the South China Sea and aggressively pushing its maritime territorial claims.
The navies of the four countries regularly hold drills seen as part of an initiative to counter China’s growing assertiveness in the Pacific.
Beijing maintains that its military is purely defensive to protect what it says are its sovereign rights and calls the Quad an attempt to contain its economic growth and influence.
For Indian naval planners, the South China Sea remains a top concern, with about 60 % percent of India’s cargo passing through shipping lanes in the Beijing-dominated region.
Chawla said India doesn’t have ‘strength to project power into the South China Sea right now’ because of the vast Chinese maritime assets there.
“Frankly, if it comes to a shooting war, India does not really have the capability and Quad does not have the mandate,” he said. “You know it’s not a NATO-like alliance yet” (AP).
India Pivots Away From Russian Arms
India is seeking to distance itself from its largest arms supplier after Russia’s ability to supply munitions and spares was hobbled by its war in Ukraine, but must step carefully to avoid pushing Moscow closer to China, Indian experts said (Reuters, Jan. 28).
The world’s biggest arms importer is slowly turning West as the United States looks to strengthen ties in the Indo-Pacific region, hoping to contain an ascendant China by weaning the South Asian nation off a traditional dependence on Russia.
Russia supplied 65 % percent of India’s weapons purchases of more than US Dollar $ 60 billion during the last two decades, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), but the Ukraine war hastened the impetus to diversify its weapons base.
“We are not likely to sign any major military deal with Russia,” said Nandan Unnikrishnan, a Russia expert at New Delhi think tank the Observer Research Foundation. “That would be a red line for Washington” (Reuters).
The writer can be reached at: shashipbmalla@hotmail.com
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect People’s Review’s editorial stance.
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