* Ukraine In: “An Unwinnable War”?
The Case for a Negotiated Settlement
By Shashi P.B.B. Malla
Ukraine at the Crossroads
The prominent American political scientist Samuel Charap at the RAND Corporation (he also served on the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. Department of State during the Obama administration) argues that while the United States was absolutely correct – until now — to concentrate on assisting Ukraine as it countered Russian aggression, it has no clear-cut objective. It has been nebulous at best (Foreign Affairs, July/August 2023).
Charap argues that this approach made sense in the initial months of the conflict as the trajectory of the war was far from clear at that point.
But now the time was ripe for the United States to develop a vision for how to end the war.
Nearly seventeen months of fighting had now made it clear that neither side had the capacity to achieve a decisive military victory, i.e. they had reached an impasse.
A devastating, years-long conflict that does not produce a definite outcome is not in the long-term interests of either the two antagonists or the United States and its Western allies.
The United States must, therefore, develop an effective exit strategy for what has now become the most consequential international crisis in a generation, i.e. it must start facilitating an endgame.
Winning at What Cost?
Charap stresses that Western policymakers’ attention has primarily been devoted to delivering the military hardware, intelligence, and training necessary to make Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive produce meaningful gains.
However, he is not convinced that the counteroffensive will produce a militarily decisive outcome.
Indeed, “ even a major movement of the frontline will not necessarily end the conflict.”
In fact, “territorial conquest – or re-conquest – is not in itself a form of war termination.”
Charap maintains that the hope in Western capitals that Kyiv’s gains on the battlefield will force Putin to the negotiating table is completely misplaced, since losing territorial control does not equate to losing a war, neither does it necessarily induce political concessions.
States have chosen to keep on fighting despite recognizing the inevitability of defeat, as Germany in World War I.
Mission Impossible
It is important to recognize the two key aspects of the ongoing conflict:
- the persistent threat that both sides will pose to each other, and
- the unsettled dispute over the areas of Ukraine that Russia has claimed to annex.
Thus, no matter where the frontline is, Russia and Ukraine will have the capabilities to pose a permanent threat to each other.
Charap is of the opinion that sooner or later, the war will end without a resolution to the territorial dispute.
Both sides will have to settle for a de facto line of control that neither recognizes as an international border – like the Sino-Indian boundary (after the brief autumn war of 1962) or the Indo-Pakistani one (after several wars and skirmishes).
A ‘Forever War’
According to Charap, the various immutable factors could well produce a drawn-out hot war between Russia and Ukraine.
A study from the Center for Strategic and International Studies found that “when interstate wars last longer than a year, they extend to over a decade on average.”
Charap writes that after all its sacrifices, Ukraine doesn’t deserve such a fate.
A recent RAND study, which he co-authored, shows that a protracted conflict would keep the risk of possible escalation – either to Russian nuclear use or to a Russian-NATO war – at its current elevated level.
This means that Ukraine would be on near-total economic and military life support from the West.
Strategy for War Termination
Under these circumstances, Western governments should continue to do everything to help Ukraine with the counteroffensive, but at the same time they urgently need to adopt a strategy for war termination – a vision for an endgame.
Since fundamental differences between Moscow and Kyiv on core issues such as borders will persist, Charap rules out a peace treaty or comprehensive political settlement that normalizes relations.
Instead, he sees the most plausible ending of hostilities in an armistice agreement.
An armistice which is essentially a durable cease-fire agreement that does not bridge political divides, would end the hot-war between Russia and Ukraine but not their broader conflict.
The archetypal case is the 1953 Korean armistice, which dealt exclusively with the mechanics of maintaining a cease-fire and left all political issues off the negotiating table.
North and South Korea are technically still at war, and both claim the entirety of the Korean peninsula as their sovereign territory, but the armistice has largely held – even after 70 years!
Charap insists: “Such an unsatisfactory outcome is the most likely way this war will end.”
US President Joe Biden’s May 22 op-ed in The New York Times made clear that his administration sees the Russo-Ukraine war ending at the negotiating table.
However, neither the US government, its allies, or Kyiv have undertaken anything to think through the practicalities and substance of eventual negotiations.
The Steep Costs of Waiting
Initiating diplomatic steps need not affect efforts to assist Ukraine militarily or to impose costs on Russia.
Historically, fighting and talking at the same time has been a common practice in wars.
Charap notes that opening a negotiating channel with Russia should complement, not contradict, the push on the battlefield.
A functioning diplomatic channel would be the only way to learn whether the Kremlin is ready, willing and able to compromise – and to what extent.
An effective strategy to end the war will require both coercion and diplomacy.
However, waiting to set the stage for negotiations will have staggering costs. Charap implies that the best time is now.
Moreover, the longer the Western allies and Ukraine go without developing a diplomatic strategy, the harder it will be to do so.
Conflict diplomacy, after all, cannot yield results overnight. Devising measures to make the cease-fire hold will be a thorny but critical task.
Data from the resolution of previous conflicts have shown that strong agreements that arrange for demilitarized zones, third-party guarantees, peacekeeping, joint commissions for dispute resolution and contain specific language produced more lasting cease-fires.
These mechanisms reinforce the principles of reciprocity and deterrence that allow even sworn enemies to achieve a semblance of coexistence without resolving their fundamental differences.
Security commitments to Ukraine – air-tight assurance that Kyiv will not face Russia alone if Moscow attacks again – should be part of the new equation.
One potential model is the US-Israel 1975 memorandum of understanding. This would give Kyiv an enhanced sense of security.
It will also be absolutely necessary for the US and allies to supplement the coercive pressure being applied to Russia with efforts to make peace a more attractive option, such as conditional sanctions relief.
Start Talking Now
Charap suggests that it is high noon for the United States to make a concerted effort to develop the diplomatic track and give it an administrative structure.
Next, it should start informal discussions with Ukraine and among allies in the G – 7 and NATO regarding the endgame.
In parallel, the US should establish a regular channel of communication regarding the war that includes Ukraine, US allies, and Russia.
No doubt, an endgame premised on an armistice would leave Ukraine – at least temporarily – without all its territory.
However, it would have the opportunity to recover economically, and the death and destruction would cease.
The risks of a direct military clash between the West and Russia would decrease dramatically, and the global consequences of the war would be mitigated.
Should Ukraine Negotiate With Russia?
Charap does have his share of detractors, and his article has sparked a discussion in Foreign Affairs, July 13 about the necessity/propriety of ending the war.
Dmytro Natalukha, a member of the Ukrainian parliament and its chair of the Committee for Economic Affairs, rejects any negotiations with Putin.
He writes: “The sooner Western governments reach a consensus on Putin…the sooner Ukraine will be able to destroy Russia’s invading forces and bring the war to an end.”
Alina Polyakova (Adjunct Professor of European Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies) and Daniel Fried (former US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs) write that Ukraine should aim for victory, not compromise.
They write: “Starting negotiations now would mean accepting Putin’s maximalist terms.”
They also assert that many examples over the past century indicate that appeasement never leads to durable peace.
Angela Stent (Professor Emerita at Georgetown University) also writes that Russia can be stopped only on the battlefield.
She notes that there is a huge problem in trying to negotiate with Putin’s Russia: “Moscow has broken every security-related agreement it has signed with Ukraine.”
She also writes Moscow has shown no sign of interest in having serious conversations with Ukraine or the West.
Charap Counters
The distinguished political scientist notes that the critiques do not offer a coherent alternative endgame to the one he argues is most likely.
He notes that his critics seem to see diplomacy as a synonym for surrender rather than as an important tool of statecraft.
He is emphatic that negotiations are the means by which states can turn coercive pressure into leverage to accomplish their goals.
He quotes the brilliant Thomas Schelling: “The power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it is diplomacy – vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy.”
He also points out that starting negotiations does not require ‘accepting Putin’s maximalist terms’. Accepting the other side’s maximalist terms is capitulation, not negotiation.
Charap also underlines the importance of having active channels of communication: to operate on direct knowledge, not assumptions, about the other side’s bargaining position and its evolution over time.
“In international politics, one does not get to choose one’s interlocutors. And there is no plausible path to ending the war that does not entail engaging Moscow.”
The writer can be reached at: shashipbmalla@hotmail.com
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