- India: A Foot in Both Camps
- Russia’s Future After the Wagner Group Mutiny
- NATO & Ukraine’s Pending Membership
By Shashi P.B.B. Malla
India: The Next Great Power?
Last month’s state visit to Washington by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi generated a storm of American analysis pointing out that closer friendship between the US and Indian democracies makes a lot of sense given the geopolitical implications of China’s superpower rise (CNN/Meanwhile in America, July 5).
But after the pageantry of his state dinner at the White House and the supreme symbolism of his address to both houses of Congress, it must have been quite jarring to his American interlocutors that Modi spent America’s Independence Day (July 4) hosting a virtual summit that included US arch-rivals China, Russia and Iran.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was founded by China and Russia early in this century and is a mutual cooperation forum that covers vast tracts of Eurasia and is seen by both sides as a way to counter pro-Western security blocs and organizations.
The latest summit was notable for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s first appearance on the international stage since he ‘suppressed’ an armed rebellion by the Wagner Group mercenaries.
The Kremlin’s now ‘not-so-much Strongman’ used his speech to defiantly vow that Russia would continue to resist external political pressures and sanctions.
Iran meanwhile became the ninth full member of the SCO at the New Delhi meeting – amid fresh talk of closer ties between the Islamic Republic, China and Russia that could threaten US interests from Europe to Asia – according to perceptions of US pundits.
India’s Role of Multi-Alignment
India is now playing a multi-faceted role in the international arena – and it is quite complicated.
Alone from the optics, Modi’s choice to hob nob with Washington’s most sworn foes does suggest that Washington’s spin about an informal new great power alignment with New Delhi is a little premature.
India, a long-time member of the non-aligned movement, tends to look after its own interests fairly ruthlessly as it relentlessly positions itself as a leader of developing nations – the so-called Global South.
However, considering its own intense competition with China, India does have strong incentives to strengthen relations with Washington.
Modi secured new access to US defence contracts in Washington.
India has its own concerns over China’s more assertive role in Asia – not least in its own so-called ‘backyard’ and amid tensions across their vast mutual border.
It is a robust player in South-East Asia and can now be considered an active Middle-Eastern power – with strong relationships with Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Turkey and Israel.
It stands to benefit as Western states and businesses concerned about Chinese-controlled supply chains look to its surging economy – its market and manufacturing base.
Modi, therefore, remains a champion of the “free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific”.
India Avoids Military Entanglements
However, India is unlikely ever to drawn into any direct armed conflict that could erupt between the US and China – for instance over Taiwan.
And while the US and Western allies are engaged in a proxy war with Russia in Ukraine, New Delhi has been an eager customer of cheap Russian oil that Western states will no longer buy. It also still imports much of its military hardware from Russia.
Modi has also subtly conveyed that he is quite capable of dancing at two marriages [to use a German metaphor].
His diplomatic dance can be seen in his decision to hold the SCO summit virtually, thus avoiding the need for Modi to stand side-by-side with authoritarian leaders like Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin – avoiding the Western anathema of ‘birds of a feather flock together’.
The SCO-event is also a reminder that while every foreign policy question in Washington is increasingly seen through the prism of the escalating American confrontation with Beijing, the rest of the world doesn’t necessarily share this obsession (CNN/Stephen Collinson).
What Next in Russia?
The extraordinary march of Wagner Group Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s armed forces to within 200 km of the capital Moscow ended abruptly on June 24.
But the drama does not end there.
Prigozhin’s sudden decision to stand down and move to Belarus is still unclear.
The immediate crisis for Russian President Vladimir Putin has been dissipated, but the future trajectory of his regime is a huge question mark.
In the coming days, weeks, months and beyond there are many possibilities; the probabilities are more of a conjecture.
Jeffrey Cimmino, the deputy director of operations at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security has sketched four possible paths for Russia’s future (New Atlanticist, July 6).
- A Weakened Putin Continues Ruling
Putin finally restores order and effectively reduces the ability of Prigozhin and the Wagner Group to challenge his absolute rule (which has become shaky).
Prigozhin could stay in Belarus with a diminished force, while other Wagner fighters go home or join the ranks of the regular Russian army.
However, even if Putin remains in power for the foreseeable future, the façade of order and stability that he has constructed in 23 years in power has now been shattered.
Russia’s would-be tsar has now shown himself to be vulnerable to competing actors.
He has to find ways and means to keep different oligarchical interests and different power brokers in line.
Russia’s internal dynamics will also shape, and be shaped by, the war effort in Ukraine, which after all, was the source of the rebellion in the first place.
- Establishment of a New Regime
Putin may suffer the same fate as Soviet President and General Secretary of the Communist Party, Mikhael Gorbachev in the summer of 1991.
Then, Kremlin hardliners attempted a coup but failed.
However, Gorbachev was weakened and edged out of power by the end of the same year.
Similarly, Putin’s position may have been irreparably damaged and rapidly deteriorates.
Internal rivals may line up, consolidating strength and waiting for the right opportunity to strike.
At the same time, Ukraine’s counteroffensive could pick up steam and break through weak points in Russia’s lines.
The collapse of the Russian defence could diminish morale further among Russian troops and many could abandon the army and stream back to Russia.
This would be the moment for Putin’s adversaries in the political and military elites to strike decisively against Putin to remove him from power.
However, chaos is avoided and the new regime consolidates power quickly.
A civil war is prevented and order restored in a post-Putin era.
- Descent into Disorder & Civil War
This is the worst case scenario.
The current temporary pause in tensions may not last long.
Putin’s adversaries – who are yet incognito – may be emboldened by his apparent weakness, which is exacerbated by a deteriorating situation on the battlefield in Ukraine.
Only, in this case there is/are no competitor(s) strong enough to consolidate power.
Russia could fracture into competing power blocs.
This means that Putin could retain power and loyalists in some parts of Russia, even as nationalists leaders develop fiefdoms elsewhere.
Further complicating the situation would be the rise of secessionist movements that further divide Russia.
As civil war rages at home, the Russian lines in Ukraine would collapse as command-and-control disintegrates.
In Russia, competing power players would vie for the loyalty of embittered but battle-hardened soldiers returning home.
- Reformers Seize the Moment
A fourth – very optimistic – scenario sees the (distant) possibility of a reform-minded regime coming to power in Moscow.
Putin manages to keep power through the March 2024 Russian presidential election, which is marked – as usual – by fraud and widely recognized among the populace as illegitimate.
A more democratically inclined opposition could seize the opportunity and manage to cultivate sufficient popular support, with rallies and protests across Russia promoting change.
Under intense pressure, Kremlin elites could express sympathy with the reformers, and Putin ultimately decides to step down.
A reformist leader could then win the ensuing constitutionally mandated presidential election.
After assuming and consolidating power, the new government could seek a quick end to the war in Ukraine.
At home, it would focus on implementing anti-corruption and political reforms in Russia.
There is, of course, the extremely remote possibility that Putin sees the writing on the wall and voluntarily abdicates power, for instance by announcing that he will not stand in the 2024 presidential election. This would mean that a leopard can indeed change its spots!
Ukraine Joining NATO Now Highly Risky
Two American scholars have made a powerful argument not to support Ukraine’s membership of NATO.
Writing in Foreign Affairs, both academics at the Cato Institute, Justin Logan and Joshua Shifrinson (also associate professor at the University of Maryland) maintain that the costs of expanding the alliance far outweigh the benefits (July 7).
They have understanding for Ukraine’s desire to join NATO. It makes perfect sense that a country that has been bullied and invaded by a far stronger neighbor to seek the protection of an outside power.
However, the stakes are very high. The way in which the membership issue is settled will have serious consequences for the United States, Europe and the wider world.
NATO leaders themselves, including President Joe Biden, perceive that admitting Ukraine involves a very real possibility of war – including nuclear war – with Russia.
Logan and Shifrinson point out that admitting Ukraine to NATO would raise the prospect of a grim choice between a war with Russia and its devastating consequences or the choice of backing down and devaluing NATO’s security guarantee across the entire alliance.
The writers reject the various claims made on behalf of Ukraine’s membership:
- European stability and security require Ukraine to join the alliance.
- NATO membership is the only way to protect the country from Russian designs.
- Ukraine has “earned” NATO membership by fighting and weakening an adversary of the alliance.
They argue that there is no justification for taking on the high risks.
However, in the latest plea for Ukraine membership, Alyona Getmanchuk (founder and director of the New Europe Center think tank) argues: “As long as Ukraine remains in NATO limbo, Putin will attack Ukraine again and again with the hope of creating a new Russian Empire” (International New York Times, July 10).
There is also the question of the costs of defending Ukraine. NATO is already struggling to find the conventional forces and operating concepts it needs to service the alliances existing commitments.
Inviting Ukraine to join NATO would only exacerbate the gap between the alliance’s commitments and its capabilities.
Moreover, the US itself faces serious resource demands both at home and in Asia.
Then also, a plan for membership makes Russian aggression in Ukraine more than less likely.
The deliberations this week in Vilnius should reflect these stark choices.
Ahead of the summit, the old/new Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg set out a new programme that not only offers Kyiv the promise of future membership but also enhanced security guarantees.
But it will not define the conditions for which American or any member’s troops would fight in Ukraine.
It is a face-saving device for both NATO and Ukraine and does not in any way provoke or encourage Russia.
Above all, it opens the door to diplomatic negotiations.
The writer can be reached at: shashipbmalla@hotmail.com
Login to add a comment