Review of World Politics
By Shashi P.B.B. Malla
No Respite for Nepalese – Yet
For all his bravado, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba has not been able to deliver as yet. He did become PM by accident, default or pure chance – just forget the soothsayers – and judging by his party’s miserable numbers in parliament, he does not enjoy the mandate of the people. But by taking on the mantle in these difficult times, Deuba has tacitly promised good governance. If he is not up to the task, he has only himself to blame:
“Men at some time are masters of their fates:
The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
But in ourselves, that we are underlings.”
In the domestic arena, he has become a prisoner of his Communist allies, who seem to be dictating the agenda. He has not been able to present a full-scale council of ministers to do urgent work. He doesn’t seem motivated to confront the country’s multiple crises head-on. By now, he should have been able to appoint full-bodied ministers, at least in the portfolios of health and foreign affairs; but he is dilly-dallying.
In foreign affairs, he made the facile statement that in international relations, ‘a country has no permanent friends and no permanent enemies.’ This is completely outdated, and coming from a person reputed to have studied at the famous ‘London School of Economics & Political Science’ [his academic sojourn was financed by the German Social Democratic Party] outrageous! Deuba Ji, as well as, his advisers and aides have to brush up on their Geography and History! It seems that their knowledge of these key disciplines is restricted to the following:
The Art of Geography is different from History
Geography is about Maps,
But History is about Chaps!
Before the dawn of history, there is Nepal’s geography. Nepal was and remains a ‘land-locked country [like Bhutan and Afghanistan with SAARC membership]. Nepal’s geopolitical situation dictates its foreign policy. Nepal can only be friends with its giant neighbours and it can favour neither. Logically, this means that it cannot cultivate so-called “special relations” with one or the other. Its policy must unwaveringly be one of political “equidistance”.
Then, there is Nepal’s history. From time immemorial – from the time the country was restricted to the confines of the Valley – the rulers have been cognizant of Nepal’s precarious geographical setting. This perspective found its culmination in the perspicacious formulation by the Great Unifier, Prithvi Narayan Shah who laid down that respect and distance were to be accorded in equal measure to the great countries in the north and south. As long as the current political boundaries remain as they are, Nepal cannot budge from this stance.
Historically, great nations have been known to carve up smaller and weaker countries lying between them, like Poland which lost its independent existence in the 18th century falling prey to Sweden, Russia, Austria and Prussia, and emerging again as a sovereign nation only after World War I in 1918.
To avoid becoming a playball of the great powers, Nepal has to rely on astute diplomacy. Unfortunately, this fine art has decayed during the time of loktantra, or ‘people’s democracy’. This translates into utilizing political power to milking state coffers to the maximum extent. This is also reflected in the appointment of unworthy, incompetent, unschooled and untrained party hacks and supporters as ambassadors, to the great detriment of our national interest! At the same time, this continuing practice is also a reflection on us as responsible and enlightened citizens that we allow and tolerate such behaviour from our so-called leaders!
Shri Deuba is taking his own sweet time in making diplomatic appointments, although our embassies play a key role in projecting our image in the international arena and also in supporting international cooperation, including development aid.
Afghanistan: Taliban Victory Not Inevitable!
America’s ‘forever war’ in Afghanistan has not really ended, but taken on a new dimension. Foreign Policy’s Michael Hirsh has described the US hasty withdrawal as “America’s greatest strategic disaster” (July 26).
In the latest contribution to the raging Afghanistan debate, Seth G. Jones [Senior Vice President of the Washington based Center for Strategic and International Studies and a former Senior Adviser to U.S. Special Operations Command in Afghanistan] one of the most erudite and experienced national security pundits has argued that a Taliban victory is not inevitable and that there are ways and means to prevent catastrophe in a post-American Afghanistan [Foreign Affairs, July 21, 2021]. But the Biden administration has to listen!
Jones is clear that Biden’s unilateral decision to withdraw all U.S. forces was a colossal mistake. It would have been far better to retain deploying about 2,000 troops, as well as, a small number of aircraft and helicopters at major bases, to provide training and other aid to Afghan forces. Jones doesn’t mention it, but relinquishing the Bagram Air Base was also a strategic error of the first water.
U.S. National Security Interests
There were three vital U.S. national security interests involved in the American engagement in Afghanistan, and regrettably, the State Department, the Pentagon and the CIA did not offer enough resistance to Biden’s personal befuddled animus to U.S. military presence [a carryover from his time as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and vice president]. His Secretary of State and National Security Adviser also bear a great deal of culpability for the dire developments in the war-torn country.
America’s vital interests in Afghanistan and the wider region [West Asia & Central Asia] can be briefly summarized:
Preventing Afghanistan from again becoming a sanctuary for terrorists who could threaten the United States and its allies [NATO members and others]. As the Taliban becomes resurgent, al Qaeda will follow suit. The local affiliate of the Islamic State (ISIS) will also attempt to rebuild.
It is in the interests of the United States to limit the influence of Russia, China and Iran from the point of view of realpolitik. The U.S. has an extended interest in minimizing the possibility of an enormous humanitarian crisis, and this is bound to happen if, first, the Taliban take over the entire country [the worst-case scenario], and second, if a bloody civil war were to engulf the entire country [a scenario of epic proportions].
2.7 million refugees have already been displaced from the country and this number will likely balloon as the violence escalates. The Biden administration has no answer to the refugee/migrant problem, as the U.S. is already overwhelmed on its southern border to Mexico, as well as, possibly from the Caribbean islands of Cuba and Haiti on its doorsteps. The Afghan refugees will be a greater problem for Iran and Pakistan, and, of course, the European Union (EU).
Taliban Strategy & the Collapsing Afghan State
With U.S. and NATO military forces leaving helter-skelter and the so-called peace talks in complete disarray, from the U.S. perspective, the military balance of power has shifted dramatically in favour of the Taliban and their regional/international backers – Pakistan, Iran and Russia.
The militant/extremist Islamist Taliban are now poised to re-establish their long sought after Islamic Emirate through military force. This consists of a combination of conventional operations; guerrilla tactics, including ambushes, raids; and long-perfected terrorist actions like suicide bombings.
The Taliban leaders may increasingly focus their operations on urban centres in such strategically important provinces as Helmand, Kandahar, Kunduz and Kabul, and then attempt to create a domino effect in cities around the country.
The Speed of Collapse & the Possibility of Resistance
In spite of what is happening currently in Afghanistan, Jones is not convinced that the Taliban can maintain their momentum. Their forthcoming speed will depend on several factors:
The extent to which the United States and other countries continue to provide military, financial, and other aid to the Afghan government and anti-Taliban groups, e.g. ethnic and regional militias, like the erstwhile Northern Alliance.
The degree to which the Afghan security forces – army, police and intelligence units – fracture along ethnic and patronage lines. The faster Afghan government units disintegrate, the faster the Taliban can seize and hold territory.
Then again, there are some highly motivated and well-trained units, such as the Afghan National Army Commando Corps which may inspire other Afghan forces to keep on fighting. However, they will be dependent on external support to sustain their operations.
An important restraining factor is whether the Taliban face serious challenges from other extremist groups, such as the Islamic State Khorasan, which would force them to divert resources from fighting the regular Afghan security forces.
The final factor that could affect the tempo of a Taliban power assumption in Kabul is the ability of the Afghan government to retain its legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people.
If more and more Afghans view the current government as weak, ineffective and illegitimate, the probability of its collapse will be augmented.
However, according to Jones, even if all of the above factors tilt in favour of the Taliban, the militant group will be hard-pressed in controlling all of Afghanistan. In addition, there is a rural-urban divide. More than in the countryside, in urban areas, most Afghans reject the Taliban’s extremist ideology, conservative form of Islam and brutal tactics. Conquering areas is not the same thing as providing efficient administration and good governance.
There is, therefore, still an opening for Washington to come back from the brink and avoid a complete takeover of the country.
Various Options to Come Out of the Morass
The very versatile analyst suggests various immediate options for the U.S. to come out of the morass of its own making, but time is of the essence – a hasty withdrawal requires immediate reconsideration and prompt action in a complex and rapidly evolving war:
Phasing out US aid and finally terminating it would mean the death-knell of the Afghan government, a Taliban battlefield victory, the reconstitution of the country as a safe haven for international terrorist groups, and the onslaught of a major humanitarian catastrophe.
The next option would be to continue providing financial help and equipment to Afghan security forces but to stop all training and operations. Such a half-hearted measure would not achieve much in the long run. It is not only too late outsourcing military operations to other countries [it should have been part of the decision-making and planning process], the ramifications of success/failure of such a contingency have not been considered.
One of the US’s leading expert analysts, therefore, pleads that the best alternative would be to continue providing military assistance from the air and covert forces on the ground through a strategy of what is known in military circles as “armed overwatch”.
In practice, such an “armed overwatch” would constitute the following:
The United States and its international partners would continue to provide funding to the Afghan government and its panoply of military, police and intelligence units. Keeping them functioning is essential to keeping the Taliban at bay.
The U.S. should fly regular missions for the purpose of striking targets and gathering intelligence. Russia has already vetoed a nearby staging area – in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan, which it considers it is an area of influence. But why go so far, when the near is readily available? The US and NATO should re-purpose the Bagram airbase, guarded by crack Afghan commandos and with many layers of exterior security. The areas within and outside could be used for training.
Special operations forces from the CIA and the US military should continue to train and equip Afghan forces and allied militias within and outside Afghanistan.
In short, if the Biden administration opted for such a minimal course of action, it could at least achieve a strategic stalemate. The Taliban could still hold parts of the countryside and some urban areas, but its sway over the country would not be total. After making an impetuous, impulsive, reckless and premature decision to suddenly abandon a loyal ally and legitimately elected government without the necessities to defend itself and its people, Biden has to walk back [from the wrong path] and give the Afghan government a fighting chance to work towards a checkmate.
This minimum survival programme is in the best US interests and will minimize the possibility that Afghanistan will again degenerate into a terrorist sanctuary, prevent the Taliban from controlling the entire country [and preventing a humanitarian catastrophe] and keep in check malign external influence.
Dire Forecasts for US Mid-Term Elections
There is little doubt that what happens domestically in the United States affects the world directly or indirectly – the ripple effects will be felt by some countries more than others. This is also the case with the Congressional mid-term elections in November 2022 which are already casting a long shadow over President Joe Biden’s domestic agenda.
As things now stand, the Republican Party [or the ‘Grand Old Party’/GOP] needs to gain only five seats net to take control of the House of Representatives and a mere one seat to control the Senate [at present 50-50, with Vice President Kamala Harris as the President of the Senate casting the crucial tie-breaking vote in favour of the Democrats].
In the history of U.S. elections, there have only been two midterms since 1946 in which the president’s party gained seats in the House: in 1998 and 2002, and in each case, there were exceptional circumstances.
Of course, in 2022 something similar could also tilt the balance in favour of the Democrats, such as the state of the economy or a ‘wild card’ issue such as an international crisis (Oxford Analytica Weekly Brief, July 23).
However, the trend has always been that the party that holds the White House suffers badly in the midterm polls. Since the end of the Second World War, the president’s party has lost an average of 25 House seats in the midterms.
This near iron-clad rule of American electoral politics means that Democrats and Republicans have already started their manoeuvres with regard to short-term tactics and long-term strategy.
Currently, since the 2022 midterm elections, ceteris paribus, [as economists are wont to say] are likely to result in Republican control of at least one chamber of Congress – probably the House – if not both, the Biden administration has to get most of its political agenda done before November 2022.
If long-term trends hold, President Biden’s role as policy initiator would end and leave him with only veto powers to block aspects of the Republican Congressional agenda in the last two years of his term.
Given the political make-up of the current GOP, the final two years of the Biden presidency could become a period of policy stalemate, with both parties playing to their relative bases ahead of the 2024 presidential elections– which, of course, would again be an open book with regard to both chambers and the White House.
The writer can be reached at: shashipbmalla@hotmail.com
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